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I. INTRODUCTION
In April 1967, Aretha Franklin released what would
become her signature song—the timeless classic, “Respect.”1 This
emotionally evocative track—with its fervent vocal delivery,
wailing horns, and funky guitar—was Franklin’s “first Number
One hit and the single that established her as the Queen of Soul.”2
By all standards, it was a massive success for the legendary
American singer—an artistic triumph that she would not be able to
top during the remaining years of her bright career. In addition to
being Franklin’s crowning musical achievement, her impassioned
plea for respect also served as inspiration for the feminist
movement of the 1960s. The song resonated as an “assertion of
selfhood in the women’s movement,” and, in the process, solidified
its place as an “enduring milestone” in popular music.3 To this day,
its influence remains as strong as ever, having been selected by
Rolling Stone as the fifth greatest song of all time.4
Although “Respect” is most commonly associated with
Aretha Franklin, it was in fact written and first recorded by the late
Otis Redding in 1965.5 Redding’s version—which differed
significantly from Franklin’s later interpretation—was well
received, peaking at number thirty-five on the Billboard charts.6
However, it was not until Franklin lent her powerful and soulful
voice to the composition—and significantly reworked the style and

1

PETER GURALNICK, SWEET SOUL MUSIC: RHYTHM AND BLUES AND THE
SOUTHERN DREAM OF FREEDOM 332 (1986).
2
500 Greatest Songs of all Time, Aretha Franklin, ‘Respect’, ROLLING
STONE, http://www.rollingstone.com/music/lists/the-500-greatest-songs-of-alltime-20110407/aretha-franklin-respect-20110516 (last visited July 14, 2013).
3
Aretha Franklin Biography, THE ROCK & ROLL HALL OF FAME MUSEUM,
http://rockhall.com/inductees/aretha-franklin/bio (last visited July 14, 2013).
4
Aretha Franklin Biography, supra note 3.
5
GURALNICK, supra note 1, at 150-51.
6
Otis Redding Chart History, BILLBOARD, http://www.billboard.com/artist/
320562/otis-redding/chart?page=1&f=379 (last visited Feb. 18, 2014).
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arrangement—that the song became the classic that it is today.7
The enormous success of Franklin’s version completely eclipsed
that of the original—so much so that even Redding himself
playfully commented that she “stole that song from” him.8 Yet,
despite Franklin’s invaluable contributions to Redding’s
composition, the U.S. Copyright Act does not grant her full public
performance9 rights in her recording.10 The Copyright Act grants a
full public performance right to authors of “musical works,”11 but
only a partial performance right to authors of “sound recordings.”12
Specifically, “[t]he exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a
sound recording are limited”13 to public performances “by means
of a digital audio transmission.”14 In other words, Franklin does
not have the exclusive right to perform her sound recording
publicly, and, as such, is not entitled to receive any royalties when
her recording is played on terrestrial radio stations (also known as

7

500 Greatest Songs of all Time, supra note 2.
Aretha Franklin, Respect, Composed by Otis Redding, ALLMUSIC, http://
www.allmusic.com/song/respect-mt0008606729 (last visited Feb. 20, 2014).
9
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“To perform or display a work ‘publicly’ means .
. . to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to
. . . the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the
public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same
place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.”).
10
David Byrne, Performance Royalties on Commercial Radio, THE
VLOGGERHEADS ZONE (Jan. 28, 2014, 8:26 PM), http://www.vloggerheads.com/
profiles/blogs/performance-royalties-on-commercial-radio.
11
17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2012) (“[I]n the case of literary, musical, dramatic,
and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other
audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly . . . .”).
12
Id. § 106(6) (“[I]n the case of sound recordings, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.”).
13
Id. § 114(a) (“The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound
recording are limited . . . and do not include any right of performance under
section 106(4).”).
14
Id. § 106(6).
8
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AM/FM radio).15 Despite receiving extensive airplay on AM/FM
stations since the song’s release in 1967, Franklin’s rendition of
“Respect” has not earned the singer a dime in royalties from the
terrestrial radio stations that play it. Meanwhile, Redding’s estate
continues to enjoy a full public performance right in his
composition, and is paid a royalty every time Franklin’s version of
“Respect” is played on the radio.16
As the above example illustrates, copyright law subjects
songwriters and performers to strikingly unequal treatment. For
decades, performers have been lobbying Congress to correct this
unfair imbalance in the Copyright Act.17 Their pleas, however,
have thus far been ignored, with Congress refusing, time and time
again, to extend the general performance right to sound
recordings.18 As a result, terrestrial radio stations continue to
broadcast recordings without having to compensate the performers
who bring those songs to life.19 This system not only fails to
recognize the great value that an engaging and talented performer
can add to a composition, but also provides an additional incentive
to songwriters, who enjoy the right to exclude others from publicly
performing their compositions, and are paid royalties when their
15

Performers are also not entitled to receive royalties when their songs are
played on television or in a public venue such as a restaurant or hotel. See John
Miranda, Music Licensing for Restaurants, Bars, and Retail Establishments,
CBA REC., Jan. 2014, at 47, 47.
16
Michael Huppe, "You Don't Know Me, but I Owe You Money": How
SoundExchange is Changing the Game on Digital Royalties, ENT. & SPORTS
LAW., Fall 2010, at 3, 4.
17
Sunny Noh, Better Late Than Never: The Legal Theoretical Reasons
Supporting the Performance Rights Act of 2009, 6 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 83,
91 (2009).
18
Byrne, supra note 10.
19
If sound recordings were subject to a full public performance right,
terrestrial broadcasters would be required to pay sound recording copyright
holders for the use of such works. Often the performer’s record label owns the
sound recording copyright in recordings that they have financed. See infra Part
II.A.
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songs are played.20 Moreover, the United States is the only
developed country in the world that does not grant performers full
public performance rights, “placing the United States in a category
with North Korea, China, and Iran in excluding these rights.”21
Many countries have reciprocated by withholding millions of
dollars in royalties from American performers, resulting in a
significant economic loss for the United States.
In the 1990s, new methods of consuming music were
introduced to the world with the advent of the Internet. The new
technologies brought about during the Internet revolution had a
devastating effect on music sales, wreaking havoc on the tried-andtested business model of the music industry. One such technology
is “webcasting”—the non-interactive, continuous transmission of
music or other audio programming on the Internet to one or more
persons.22 Also known as “Internet radio,” webcasting is
essentially the Internet equivalent of a terrestrial radio broadcast.
Like other digital audio services such as satellite radio and cable
radio, webcasting offers crisp sound quality that is arguably
superior to that of analog terrestrial radio. Concerned that these
new technologies had the potential to bring the music industry to
its knees, the recording industry was finally able to convince
Congress that those whose livelihoods depended on music sales
deserved stronger rights under the Copyright Act.23 As a result,
Congress enacted the Digital Performance Right in Sound
Recording Act of 1995,24 which provided performers with a limited
public performance right in their recordings. The right was limited
20

17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 114 (2012).
Noh, supra note 17, at 103 n.167.
22
Rebecca F. Martin, Note, The Digital Performance Right in the Sound
Recordings Act of 1995: Can It Protect U.S. Sound Recording Copyright
Owners in A Global Market?, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 733, 743 (1996).
23
Id. at 744.
24
Digital Performance Right in Sound Recording Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.
104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.)
[hereinafter DPRA 1995].
21
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in the sense that it only granted performers the exclusive right to
license the performance of their copyrighted works publicly by
means of a digital audio transmission. That is, terrestrial radio
stations were not affected by the Act, and remain free to continue
broadcasting songs without permission from—and without paying
any royalties to—performers.25
Today, depending on the medium used to broadcast a sound
recording, the compensation paid to the performer varies
considerably.26 That is to say, the law is violating the core
governing economic principle that laws be technologically
neutral.27 Whereas terrestrial broadcasters are exempt from paying
performers any royalties for the use of their recordings, webcasters
are required to pay exorbitant fees, which, in some cases, “often
approach or even exceed 100% of revenue for many webcasters.”28
Satellite radio and digital cable radio services, meanwhile, are also
required to pay a royalty to performers—yet, because these
services are grandfathered to a different royalty rate determination
standard than that used for webcasters, they pay fees that pale in
comparison to their Internet radio counterparts. As a result,
terrestrial broadcasters, satellite radio, and digital cable radio
services enjoy a significant advantage over webcasters, who are
struggling to survive under the current royalty scheme. This is
despite the fact that all of these services perform essentially the
same function.

25

Kamesh Nagarajan, Public Performance Rights in Sound Recordings and
the Threat of Digitalization, 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 721, 723
(1995).
26
Andrew Stockment, Note, Internet Radio: The Case for A Technology
Neutral Royalty Standard, 95 VA. L. REV. 2129, 2161–62 (2009).
27
Daniel Castro, Internet Radio and Copyright Royalties: Reforming a
Broken System, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. (May 10, 2007),
http://www.itif.org/files/InternetRadio.pdf.
28
Stockment, supra note 26, at 2161.
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As more and more webcasters are unable to sustain their
businesses due to high royalty burdens, both consumers and artists
are losing out. The fact of the matter is that Internet radio has
become incredibly popular since its introduction in the 1990s, with
listenership having reached a staggering 42% of adult U.S.
broadband households.29 Consumers have flocked to Internet radio
for a number of reasons: it can be accessed anytime—from
virtually anywhere—via applications on mobile devices,30 and it
offers musical diversity that is simply not available on terrestrial
radio.31 For these reasons, Internet radio also serves the interests of
a broad range of artists in a way that terrestrial radio cannot.32
Thus, it is crucial that the current law is changed to ensure that
webcasters are able to effectively compete with other audio
services. It is essential that consumers and artists be able to
continue to enjoy the benefits that Internet radio provides.
In this paper, I will describe, in detail, how the Copyright
Act not only provides unequal treatment to songwriters and
performers, but also unfairly discriminates against webcasters by
subjecting them to prohibitively high royalty rates. In Part II, I will
provide an overview of music copyright law, which will include a
brief historical analysis of copyright law’s bias toward songwriters
at the expense of performers. In Part III, I will discuss the advent
of the Internet and its effect on the music business. In doing so, I

29

TARGETSPOT, TARGETSPOT DIGITAL AUDIO BENCHMARK AND TREND
STUDY, 2012, at 3 (2012), available at http://www.targetspot.com/wp-content/
uploads/2012/05/TargetSpot-Digital-Audio-Benchmark-and-Trend-Study_2012White-Paper-copy.pdf.
30
Jessica L. Bagdanov, Comment, Internet Radio Disparity: The Need for
Greater Equity in the Copyright Royalty Payment Structure, 14 CHAP. L. REV.
135, 154 (2010).
31
See Kaitlin M. Pals, Note, Facing the Music: Webcasting, Interactivity,
and a Sensible Statutory Royalty Scheme for Sound Recording Transmissions,
36 J. CORP. L. 677, 692 (2011).
32
For example, Internet radio does not “suffer from the same geographical
limitations of terrestrial stations’ analog signals.” Id.
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will provide an overview of the Digital Performance Right in
Sound Recordings Act of 1995 and the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act of 1998.33 In Part IV, I will outline, in detail, the
royalty rate determination procedures used to calculate rates for
digital radio services. This will include an introduction to the two
standards used to determine rates: the 801(b) Standard, which is
applied to certain digital satellite and digital cable radio services;
and the willing buyer/willing seller standard, which is applied to
webcasters. In Part V, these two standards will be examined, in
detail, in order to demonstrate why they produce drastically
different royalty rates. Finally, in Part VI, I will propose several
measures that can be taken to correct the problems inherent in the
current public performance royalty scheme. Specifically, I will
argue that the law must be amended to become technologically
neutral. To achieve technological neutrality, two changes must be
made. First, the public performance royalty exemption currently
enjoyed by terrestrial radio stations must be brought to an end.
Second, the same royalty rate standard must be applied to all radio
services. In Part VI, I will also briefly discuss several pieces of
recent legislation that attempt to change the current status quo, but
have thus far not passed in Congress.
II. MUSIC COPYRIGHT LAW: AN OVERVIEW
A. Musical Works and Sound Recordings
Music copyright law “is notoriously complex.”34 In order to
fully appreciate the current inequity facing performers, it is
important to have a general understanding of copyright law as it
pertains to music. Unlike other works, such as paintings or poems,

33

Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) [hereinafter
DMCA 1998].
34
THOMAS D. SYDNOR II, A PERFORMANCE RIGHT FOR RECORDING
ARTISTS: SOUND POLICY AT HOME AND ABROAD 1 (2008), available at http://
www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/pop15.2performanceright.pdf.
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any given musical recording has two copyrightable elements: the
musical composition and the sound recording.35 The musical
composition (also referred to as a “musical work”) is the fixed
sequence of words, notes, and rhythms “which can be captured in
written form and which structure the ‘generic’ sound of any given
performance of a piece.”36 The sound recording, on the other hand,
is the recorded version of the underlying composition. The
Copyright Act defines a sound recording as a “fixation of a series
of musical, spoken, or other sounds . . . regardless of the nature of
the material objects, such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in
which they are embodied.”37 Whereas the musical works
category38 protects the copyright owner’s interest in the fixed
sequence of words, notes, and rhythms that amount to the
underlying song, the sound recordings category39 protects the fixed
performance of those words, notes, and rhythms. Thus, there may
be multiple cover versions of any given musical composition, each
of which is copyrightable for the originality of its sound
recording.40 Whereas “[t]he copyright in the musical work . . .
belongs to the author or composer of the song who typically
assigns his or her rights to a publisher for the purposes of

35

See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2012) (covering “musical works, including
any accompanying words”); Id. § 102(a)(7) (covering “sound recordings”).
36
Thomas P. Wolf, Note, Toward a “New School” Licensing Regime for
Digital Sampling: Disclosure, Coding, and Click-Through, 2011 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. N1 6 ¶ 12.
37
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
38
Id. § 102(a)(2).
39
Id. § 102(a)(7).
40
Brian Day, Note, The Super Brawl: The History and Future of the Sound
Recording Performance Right, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 179, 183
(2009). Note that when a copy of a literary or pictorial work is made, there are
not necessarily any accompanying changes made to the original work. However,
the performance of a musical work necessarily involves changes being made to
the original work.
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representation, . . . sound recording copyrights . . . are normally
owned by the artist or record label.”41
Together, these two separate elements create a dual layer of
copyright protection in a single recorded musical work. Because
the Copyright Act establishes these distinct interests in each song,
it is possible for multiple parties—both legal and natural persons—
to have a copyright ownership in any given musical recording.42
The simplest possible ownership scenario would involve a
songwriter who has written, and subsequently recorded, his or her
own song. So long as that performer-songwriter does not assign
ownership of the song to a third party via a publishing or recording
deal, the performer-songwriter will retain full copyright in both the
underlying composition and sound recording. Whenever that song
is then played or purchased, the performer-songwriter is entitled to
collect all of the royalties generated.43 However, the situation is
rarely this straightforward, as demonstrated by the example
involving Aretha Franklin’s version of “Respect,” and the royalty
payments generated therefrom.

41

Id. at 182–83.
David M. Jenkins, The Singer/Songwriter Wears Two Hats: An
Introduction to Music Copyrights and the Singer/Songwriter's Sources of
Income, DCBA BRIEF, Feb. 2006, at 22, 24. Note that the two-tier structure of
music copyright is universal in nature. In most jurisdictions, including Japan,
Canada and other signatories of the Rome Convention, the rights that attach to
sound recordings are known as “neighboring rights.” Whereas the structure
under such systems is different than the structure under U.S. copyright law, the
substance is essentially the same. In the Japanese Copyright Act, for example,
performers—including actors, musicians and dancers—are granted certain
economic and moral rights.
43
See id. at 25–26.
42
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Figure 1: Music Copyright Structure44
B. Copyright’s Exclusive Rights Prior to The DPRA
U.S. copyright law grants a number of exclusive rights to
the owner of a protected work. Prior to 1995, there were five such
exclusive rights enumerated in § 106 of the Copyright Act, all of
which continue in effect today. These rights include: (1) the right
to reproduce copies of the work, (2) the right to create derivative
works, (3) the right to distribute copies of the work to the public,
(4) the right to perform the work publicly, and (5) the right to

44

Brian Day, In Defense of Copyright: Record Labels, Creativity, and the
Future of Music, 21 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 61, 69 (2011).
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display the work publicly.45 However, not all protected works
enjoy the benefit of each of the five exclusive rights. Namely, with
respect to musical works and sound recordings, the law grants
significantly different rights to songwriters and recording artists.
That is, whereas songwriters enjoy the exclusive right to perform
their works publicly, recording artists do not.
As per § 106 of the Copyright Act, both the compositional
copyright holder and the sound recording copyright holder have
the exclusive rights to reproduce their works, make derivative
works, and distribute their works. The holder of the copyright in a
musical composition, however, has an additional right—the public
performance right—which does not belong to the holder of a
copyright in a sound recording.46 The public performance right
gives the compositional copyright owner the power to prevent their
work from being performed publicly, such as by way of broadcast
over any type of radio.47 This means that, before a song is played
on analog AM/FM radio stations, the broadcaster must obtain
permission from the owner of the copyright in the underlying
work.48 Moreover, whereas the compositional copyright owner is

45

17 U.S.C. § 106(1)–(5) (2012). Note that the Japanese Copyright Act
(Act No. 48 of 1970) has a similar structure with respect to exclusive rights. See
Arts. 21–28.
46
As mentioned in Part I, and to be discussed in detail below in Part III.C,
sound recording copyright owners, in 1995, were granted a limited public
performance right—namely, the exclusive right to license the performance of
their copyrighted works publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.
47
17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2012).
48
This is typically done by way of a blanket license issued by one of the
three Performing Rights Organizations (PRO) in the United States: ASCAP,
BMI and SESAC. Each of the three PROs issues blanket performance licenses
to radio stations, restaurants, bars, and other establishments that play music
publicly. Such establishments typically pay a single fee to the PRO in exchange
for the blanket license, which enables them to play any song in that PRO’s
catalog. The PRO will then distribute the license fees as royalties to its members
(i.e. songwriters, composers and music publishers) whose works have been
performed. Broadcast radio stations typically pay a percentage of their gross
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paid a royalty for the use of their song on terrestrial radio,49 the
owner of the sound recording copyright is not. Throughout the
history of terrestrial radio, stations have been—and continue to
be—free to transmit over the airwaves any sound recording,
without obtaining the permission of sound recording copyright
owners, and without paying them a dime in royalties.50
C. A History of Unequal Treatment of Songwriters and Performers
Songwriters and recording artists have always been granted
significantly different rights under U.S. copyright law. In 1831,
U.S. copyright law granted, for the first time, protection to authors
of musical compositions for reproductions in print form.51 Years
later, in 1897, songwriters saw their rights further enhanced when
they were granted a public performance right for their works.52
“During the early years, such rights were difficult to enforce.”53
Not until the enactment of the Copyright Act of 190954 did the
situation improve.55 The 1909 Act “overhauled many preceding
copyright laws, and created a clear property interest in
performance rights for musical compositions and dramatic

revenue (roughly 2% each) to both ASCAP and BMI, and slightly less to
SESAC. Stockment, supra note 26, at 2161–62.
49
A compositional copyright holder will collect royalties from whichever
PRO they have joined as a member. Each PRO uses a complicated formula to
determine how the pool of money that they have collected from copyright users
should be distributed.
50
Pals, supra note 31, at 679; see also Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 347
F.3d 485, 487 (3d Cir. 2003).
51
Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436.
52
Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481. The story of how this Act was
passed is recounted in Zvi S. Rosen, The Twilight of the Opera Pirates: A
Prehistory of the Exclusive Right of Public Performance for Musical
Compositions, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1157, 1200–16 (2007).
53
Noh, supra note 17, at 89.
54
Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075.
55
Noh, supra note 17, at 89.
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works.”56 Nevertheless, these rights were limited to public
performances that were engaged in for profit.57
By the late 1700s, “printed copies of musical works (i.e.,
sheet music) became an important source of income for music
publishers.”58 Because the use of sheet music offered a
“commercially viable means of fixing, copying and publicly
performing musical compositions,” the bolstering of federal
copyright protection for musical compositions under the Copyright
Act of 1909 became an important issue.59 A commercially viable
means of fixing and replaying sound recordings, on the other hand,
did not yet exist at the time of the enactment of the Copyright Act
of 1909.60 Consequently, the justification for extending copyright
to sound recordings had not yet arisen, and no protection was
offered for recordings under the 1909 Act.
In the years following the passage of the Copyright Act of
1909, two parallel technological developments spurred the debate
over the issue of granting copyright to sound recordings.61 On the
one hand, advancements in the development of radio transmissions
facilitated the widespread dissemination of public performances of
musical compositions.62 This was followed by advancements in
56

Id.
Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 1(e), 35 Stat. 1075.
58
Graeme W. Austin, Radio: Early Battles Over the Public Performance
Right, in COPYRIGHT AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE NEW § 5.03 115, 123 (Brad
Sherman & Leanne Wiseman eds., 2012).
59
SYDNOR, supra note 34, at 2.
60
Although “Thomas Edison had invented a means of recording and
replaying sounds in 1877,” the technologies for reproducing sound recordings
did not become commercially viable or widely adopted by consumers for years
to come. Id.
61
Id.
62
Austin, supra note 58, at 117; see also Stan J. Liebowitz, The Elusive
Symbiosis: The Impact of Radio on the Record Industry, 1 REV. ECON. RES. ON
COPYRIGHT ISSUES 93, 107 (2004) (noting that by 1923, there were more than
500 commercial radio stations operating in the United States).
57
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sound-recording technologies, to the point where “record players
became sufficiently convenient and inexpensive to become
standard consumer goods.”63 These developments, in turn, gave
rise to the modern recording industry, as consumers began
purchasing pre-recorded music for private enjoyment.64 Because
sound recordings were not protected under the Copyright Act of
1909, recording artists and record labels were forced to rely on
state common law to protect their recordings from unwanted radio
play and duplication.65 However, these laws varied from one state
to another, resulting in a patchwork of legislation and judicial
rulings.66 Any rights granted to musicians had to be enforced on a
state-to-state basis, and were thus largely ineffective in the fight
against the unauthorized distribution and airplay of records.67
Relying on the protection of state common law became even more
63

SYDNOR, supra note 34, at 2.
Id.; see also Shourin Sen, The Denial of a General Performance Right in
Sound Recordings: A Policy That Facilitates Our Democratic Civil Society?, 21
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 233, 247 (2007) (noting that, by 1946, independent record
labels were producing fifty million records per year).
65
See Sen, supra note 64, at 238 (noting that, under a strict reading of the
Copyright Act of 1909, a person could legally make copies of a recording, so
long as they compensated the composer of the underlying musical composition).
In practice, however, performers were given limited protection in a number of
U.S. states.
66
See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657
(2d Cir. 1955) (holding that the sale of sound recordings did not extinguish the
common law copyright and that the recordings are protectable under state law);
RCA Manufacturing Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940) (deciding not
to protect sound recordings, finding that printing "Not Licensed for Radio
Broadcast" on records was not sufficient to prevent radio stations from
broadcasting a record that they had bought, and that performers retained their
common law copyright only if the sound recordings were not distributed or
sold); Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 194 A. 631 (Pa. 1937)
(holding that there was a protectable state right in sound recordings that were
deemed "novel and artistic"); see also Jonathan Franklin, Pay To Play: Enacting
a Performance Right in Sound Recordings in the Age of Digital Audio
Broadcasting, 10 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 83, 89–90 (1993).
67
Franklin, supra note 66, at 89–90.
64
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problematic as the cost of sound recordings declined, and
advancements were made with respect to duplicating
technologies.68 In response, recording artists and record labels
lobbied for “the sort of federal copyright protection long enjoyed
by songwriters.”69
D. Limited Protection Granted to Performers Under The Sound
Recordings Act of 1971
Not until 1971 did Congress finally respond to the
increasing prevalence of recording piracy. They did so by enacting
the Sound Recordings Act (SRA), which extended, for the first
time, copyright protection to sound recordings.70 The SRA, which
came into effect in 1972, gave limited protection to sound
recording copyright owners by granting statutory protection
against the duplication of recordings.71 Following this enactment,
sound recording copyright owners held the exclusive rights to
reproduce, distribute, and adapt their work.72 Importantly,
however, the public performance right was specifically withheld.73
As such, radio stations were allowed to continue broadcasting
records without providing any compensation to sound recording
copyright owners. Artists and labels thus continued to miss out on
the compensation being realized by compositional copyright

68

SYDNOR, supra note 34, at 2.
Id.
70
Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971) [hereinafter Sound Recording
Act of 1971].
71
Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 487 (3d Cir. 2003)
(maintaining that “with the Sound Recording Amendment of 1971…a limited
copyright in the reproduction of sound recordings was established in an effort to
combat recording piracy”); see also Sen, supra note 64, at 238.
72
Sound Recording Act of 1971, supra note 70, at § 1(a).
73
Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 487 (3d Cir. 2003).
69
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owners, who had long been paid by broadcasters for the public
performance of their songs.74
The absence of a full performance right for sound recording
copyright owners reflects the political influence of two groups:
broadcasters,75 and music composers and publishers.76 Throughout
the history of radio, broadcasters have been a dominant force in the
fight against granting performance rights in sound recordings.77
Concerned about the financial implications of having to pay
royalties to sound recording copyright owners—on top of what
they already pay to songwriters—traditional radio broadcasters
have, for decades,78 lobbied strongly to maintain the status quo.
Traditional radio broadcasters have thus far succeeded in
preventing sound recording owners from gaining full, exclusive
performance rights in copyrighted works.79
Owners of compositional copyrights, meanwhile, have also
been particularly vocal in their opposition to a full public
performance right for sound recordings. Songwriters and
publishers—and the Performance Rights Organizations (PROs)80
who represent them—believe that there would be little to gain, and
much to lose, if the United States were to grant full public
performance rights to sound recordings. Their chief concern is that,
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Noh, supra note 17, at 88.
Sen, supra note 64, at 237.
76
Mary La France, From Whether to How: The Challenge of Implementing
a Full Public Performance Right in Sound Recordings, 2 HARV. J. SPORTS &
ENT. L. 221, 222 (2011).
77
Noh, supra note 17, at 89.
78
Id. (noting that “broadcasters . . . have proven to be a formidable
opponent [to the implementation of a full public performance right for sound
recordings] over the decades.”).
79
Andrey Spektor, How “Choruss” Can Turn Into a Cacophony: The
Record Industry’s Stranglehold on the Future of Music Business, 16 Rich. J.L.
& Tech. 3, ¶ 9 (2009), available at http://jolt.richmond.edu/v16i1/article3.pdf.
80
For an explanation of PROs, see supra note 48.
75
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should such a right be granted, the enforcement efforts of sound
recording copyright owners would interfere with their own ability
to commercially exploit their copyrighted compositions to the full
extent possible.81 That is, composers fear that the sound recording
copyright owners would “act as gatekeepers, potentially vetoing
exploitation opportunities for the copyright compositions
embodied in their sound recordings.”82 Moreover, composition
copyright owners fear that any royalties paid by users to the sound
recording copyright owners would reduce their own revenue
stream.83 Why share the pie, when you can eat it all yourself?
The heavy resistance put forward by the alliance between
broadcasters and PROs successfully blocked the imposition of a
sound recording performance right—not only under the SRA in
1971, but also under the subsequent Copyright Act of 1976.84
Despite strong lobbying by performing artists, who wanted the
same performance rights as those granted to musical works,
Congress could not be swayed.85 During the legislative processes
leading up to the passage of these Acts, it became clear that the
alleged positive impact that radio play has on record sales was the
main justification for denying a public performance right for sound
recordings.86

81

La France, supra note 76, at 222.
Id.
83
Id.
84
Day, Super Brawl, supra note 40, at 184.
85
Noh, supra note 17, at 91. Note also that the Copyright Office, as far
back as 1978, has publicly recognized the need for a public performance right in
sound recordings. See also, Performance Rights in Sound Recordings: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. of Justice of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 117 (1978).
86
Noh, supra note 17, at 91.
82
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E. The Relationship Between the Radio Industry and Record Sales
The argument put forward by broadcasters in their
opposition to a full public performance right for sound recordings
has remained unchanged for years. Led by the powerful lobby
group, the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB), they have
continually convinced Congress that radio airplay amounts to free
advertising for sound recordings.87 According to this argument, if a
consumer hears a new song on the radio, the likelihood of that
individual later purchasing that music increases.88 That is, a
symbiotic relationship is said to exist between record labels and
broadcasters.89 In exchange for the free use of sound recordings,
broadcasters provide record labels and performers with free
promotion.90 Any additional payment to sound recording copyright
owners, broadcasters argue, would represent an unwarranted
handout.91 Some have gone as far as to suggest that record labels
and performers should pay broadcasters for their advertising
services.92 The validity of this argument, as will be explained
below in Part VI, is questionable. Nonetheless, it has proven to be
persuasive. “[T]he 1971 Sound Recording Act would remain the
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Day, Super Brawl, supra note 40, at 194.
See U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Copyright Law
Revision: S. Rept 93-983 on S. 1361, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 1974 at 225–26
(1974) (noting that “for years, record companies have gratuitously provided
records to stations in hope of securing exposure by repeated play over the air.
The financial success of recording companies and artists who contract with these
companies is directly related to the volume of record sales, which in turn
depends in great measure on the promotion efforts of broadcasters”).
89
Vanessa Van Cleaf, A Broken Record: The Digital Millennium Copyright
Act’s Statutory Royalty Rate-Setting Process Does Not Work For Internet Radio,
40 STETSON L. REV. 341, 355 (2010).
90
Erich Carey, We Interrupt This Broadcast: Will the Copyright Royalty
Board’s March 2007 Rate Determination Proceedings Pull the Plug on Internet
Radio?, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 257, 264–65 (2008).
91
Sen, supra note 64, at 237.
92
Id.
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sole legislation protecting sound recordings for the next twentyfive years.”93
III. THE RISE OF THE INTERNET & WEBCASTING
A. The Internet Turns the Music Industry on its Head
The advent of the Internet in the 1990s drastically changed
the way that consumers listen to music. By introducing consumers
to a myriad of new ways to access music, the Internet has shifted
the balance of powers among music industry players, greatly
affecting the once almighty record labels.94 Music lovers can now
listen to and obtain their favorite songs online, without having to
purchase full albums.95 Moreover, as advancements in high speed
Internet access are made, Internet users are increasingly able to
access digital content instantaneously. With the click of a button,
users can listen to music whenever, and from wherever, they
choose.96 The ability to instantly access a vast and constantly
growing catalogue of music from distant locations has been
referred to as the “celestial jukebox.”97
Internet radio is the non-interactive, continuous transmission
93

Rick Marshall, The Quest For “Parity”: An Examination of the Internet
Radio Fairness Act, 60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 445, 450 (2013).
94
Rights holders, such as record labels, typically make a great effort to
combat the unauthorized distribution of their works. However, as the Internet
changes the way that people listen to music, record labels have increasingly
been embracing websites such as YouTube, which, despite hosting large
amounts of copyright infringing content, can help to advance the interests of the
record labels and artists. Jay Patel, Viral Videos: Medicine for Record Labels in
the Fight Against Copyright Termination?, 32 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 47, 52
(2012).
95
Bagdanov, supra note 30, at 136.
96
Michael P. Kella, Arista Records v. Launch Media: An Analysis of the
Second Circuit’s Ruling on Webcast Interactivity and a Look at the Current and
Future State of Interactive Webcasting Technology, 30 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REV. 199, 200 (2010).
97
Id.
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of music or other audio programming on the Internet. In essence, a
webcast is the Internet equivalent of a broadcast. It is “the
transmission of a digital audio or video file via the Internet to one
or more persons who view or listen to the file without downloading
(permanently saving) it.”98 To send music to listeners, webcasters
use a technology known as “streaming.” This process involves
dividing a streamed song into small packets of information, each of
which is likely to take a different route from the servers of the
streaming service to the user’s computer.99 Because the travel time
needed for each song fragment may vary, the user’s computer will
collect and reconstruct the first several seconds of the song in a
form of temporary RAM storage known as a “buffer.”100 Once a
user’s computer has collected and reconstructed the first several
seconds of a song, the computer begins to play the music.
Meanwhile, the computer continues to receive additional streams
of song fragments, thus keeping the buffer full, and the song
playing.101 The process is repeated until the entire song has played.
The key difference between downloading and streaming a
song is what occurs when the transmission reaches the user’s
computer.102 When a user downloads a song, a copy of that song
will remain on the user’s computer until the user chooses to erase
it. Streams, on the other hand, are designed to be used once and
then discarded.103 Unlike when music is downloaded, when a song
98

Stockment, supra note 26, at 2132.
W. Jonathan Cardi, Über-Middleman: Reshaping the Broken Landscape
of Music Copyright, 92 IOWA L. REV. 835, 861 (2007).
100
Id.
101
Amy Duvall, Royalty Rate-Setting For Webcasters: A Royal(ty) Mess,
15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 267, 268 (2008).
102
Cardi, supra note 99, at 860.
103
Duvall, supra note 101, at 269. Note that downloading a song clearly
implicates the reproduction right of both layers of the song’s copyright, but does
not implicate the public performance right unless simultaneous streaming occurs
while downloading (i.e. listening to the song via streaming while downloading
it). Streaming transmissions, on the other hand, implicate the public
99
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is streamed, the user’s computer does not retain a copy of the
sound recording. Once a streamed song fragment has been played,
it is erased and replaced in the buffer by a yet-unperformed
fragment.104 When the song has finished playing, the buffer is left
empty. In order to hear the song again, the user would have to
initiate another transmission and performance from the streaming
service’s website.105
B. Digital Audio Technology Strikes Fear Into the Hearts of the
Recording Industry
The rapid growth in digital audio technology became a
major concern for the recording industry. By 1995, digital
transmissions of musical recordings were being offered to
subscribers on the Internet.106 The recording industry feared that,
as Internet data transmission speeds increased over time, this
technological development would drastically undermine their
business model. The labels believed that if consumers could
eventually get music on-demand through an interactive, digital
service, they would stop purchasing traditional records.107
Specifically, the alternative market offered by the Internet was
thought to have the potential to cut out the recording industry's
products and erode their profits, ultimately inhibiting the creation
of new music.108 A reduction in the amount of music produced

performance right of both layers of the song, but not the reproduction right. See
Spektor, supra note 79, at 30.
104
Cardi, supra note 99, at 860.
105
Id.
106
H.R. REP. NO. 104-274, at 12 (1995); see also Arista Records, L.L.C. v.
Launch Media, Inc., 578 F.3d 148, 153 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that data
transmission over the Internet at this time was very slow (downloading a song
took an average of twenty minutes in 1994), but the recording industry foresaw
the potential of the Internet to threaten its business model as bandwidth
increased).
107
H.R. REP. NO. 104-274, at 13 (1995).
108
Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 488 (3d Cir. 2003).
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would in turn harm consumers, who would be left with less variety
to choose from.
In addition to offering a convenient, legal market to
purchase and listen to music, the Internet also greatly increased the
likelihood that copyrighted works would be used unlawfully.109
Not only did early online digital transmissions offer sound quality
far superior to that of analog recordings broadcast over terrestrial
radio, they were also much more convenient to bootleg. As such,
the recording industry foresaw that the risk of unauthorized
copying of songs streamed over the Internet would be far more
dangerous than the risk of recordings made from terrestrial
radio.110 Because one could record a streamed song that had sound
quality as good as—or substantially similar to—CD quality,111 the
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA)112 “viewed
on-demand radio as a potential market replacement for album
sales.”113
The advent of digital music transmissions brought the issue
of performance rights to the forefront, drawing “attention to the
disparity in the royalties received by performers who wrote their
material and those who did not.”114 Historically, performers—

109

See Lauren E. Kilgore, Guerrilla Radio: Has the Time Come for a Full
Performance Right in Sound Recordings?, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 549,
562 (2010) (noting that, as early as 1994, the issue of online music piracy began
to make national headlines).
110
Id. at 563.
111
Gregory F. Donahue, The Sky Is Not Falling: The Effect of a
Performance Right on the Radio Market, 87 IND. L.J. 1287, 1291 (2012).
112
The RIAA is “the trade organization that supports and promotes the
creative and financial vitality of the major music companies.” Who We Are,
RIAA, http://www.riaa.com/aboutus.php?content_selector=about-who-we-areriaa (last visited Apr. 13, 2014).
113
Kilgore, supra note 109, at 562.
114
Sen, supra note 64, at 265.
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although not possessing a public performance right115—have been
paid a royalty by their record label when their physical records are
purchased at record stores.116 With the arrival of digital audio
technology and illegal bootlegging, however, the public gained
“on-demand access to a performer’s material without having to
purchase a hardcopy.”117 The possibility thus arose that, as sales
decreased, record labels—and, consequently, performers—would
be left entirely uncompensated. This was due in part to the fact that
digital transmissions were seen as being “legally equivalent to a
public performance rather than to the purchase of a physical
album.”118 In other words, digital technology created a loophole
that enabled consumers to access music without any compensation
landing in the pockets of the labels and artists. Record labels,
represented by the RIAA, made compelling arguments before
Congress that, in light of these technological developments, the
traditional licensing structure failed to adequately protect and
compensate artists.119 Under pressure from the recording industry,

115

See Spektor, supra note 79, at 24.
Royalties paid to artists typically range between 8% and 25% of the
suggested retail price of the recording. As there is no statutorily imposed fee that
labels must pay artists, the royalty that the artist and label ultimately agree on in
the recording contract depends on the clout of the artist. Moreover, record labels
are notorious for using various sly accounting methods to reduce the amount of
money that they must pay the artist. For example, labels typically make
deductions for such things as packaging, breakage, giveaways, and returns.
Lastly, labels generally withhold the royalties owed to the artist until all
advances and costs incurred by the label are recouped. It is estimated that, after
all is said and done, the royalty paid to the artist yields significantly less than
10% of the wholesale record price. See generally Spektor, supra note 79.
117
Sen, supra note 64, at 265.
118
Id.
119
Day, Super Brawl, supra note 40, at 184. Note that, in 1995, the NAB
joined the RIAA to lobby for a limited performance right for sound recording
owners. They did so in an effort to handicap webcasters (who the NAB saw as
potential new competitors) with an additional licensing requirement and cost.
The NAB argued that the right should be limited to digital transmissions,
116
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Congress decided to reevaluate whether a performance right for
sound recordings should be granted.
C. The DPRA
In 1995, Congress enacted the Digital Performance Right in
Sound Recording Act of 1995 (DPRA).120 The DPRA benefitted
sound recording copyright owners by adding them to the list of
protectable rights found in 17 U.S.C. § 106.121 Specifically, it
granted sound recording copyright owners the exclusive right to
license the performance of their copyrighted works publicly by
means of a digital audio transmission. The DPRA was meant to
address the record industry’s concerns that “the advance of digital
recording technology and the prospect of digital transmission
capabilities created the possibility that consumers would soon have
access to services whereby they could pay for high quality digital
audio transmissions (subscription services) or even pay for specific
songs to be played on demand (interactive services).”122 Congress
wanted to ensure that those whose livelihoods depended on
effective copyright protection for sound recordings would “be
protected as new technologies affect the ways in which their
creative works are used.”123
Although the DPRA established an exclusive digital
transmission right for sound recording copyright holders, the right
was narrow in scope, and riddled with exceptions. The two
important exceptions carved out were the § 114(d)(1) limited

thereby continuing the exemption enjoyed by traditional broadcasters. See
Carey, supra note 90, at 266.
120
DPRA 1995, supra note 24.
121
See 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2012) (“The owner of copyright under this title
has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following . . . . In the
case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of
a digital audio transmission.”).
122
Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 488 (3d Cir. 2003).
123
S. REP. NO. 104-128, at 10 (1995).
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public performance right124 and the § 114(d)(2) compulsory (or
‘statutory’) license.125 These exceptions reflected compromises
worked out among the competing stakeholders; namely, sound
recording copyright holders, radio broadcasters, PROs, and music
publishers.126 The right was thus limited to:
“(1) transmissions, as opposed to live
performances (thereby exempting concerts,
restaurants, dances, amusement parks, etc.); (2) of
audio works, as opposed to audiovisual works
(thereby exempting transmissions of movies); (3)
that occur in digital format, as opposed to analog
(thereby exempting contemporaneous AM and FM
radio stations, and contemporaneous TV stations as
well).”127

124

17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1) (2012) (exempting certain non-interactive
transmissions and retransmissions, such as non-subscription broadcast
transmissions and certain retransmissions of non-subscription broadcast
transmissions); see also DPRA 1995, supra note 24. In its original wording, the
DPRA stated that “the performance of a sound recording publicly by means of a
digital audio transmission, other than as a part of an interactive service, is not an
infringement of § 106(6) if the performance is part of (A)(i) a non-subscription
transmission other than a retransmission; (ii) an initial non-subscription
retransmission made for direct reception by members of the public of a prior or
simultaneous incidental transmission that is not made for direct reception by
members of the public; or (iii) a non-subscription broadcast transmission.” Id.
This was later amended by the DMCA. See infra Part III.D.
125
17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2) (2012); see Duvall, supra note 101, at 270
(asserting that a statutory license is compulsory because it is automatically
granted to the user of the copyright work so long as the user complies with
certain requirements stipulated under the statute). Individual permission is not
required from the copyright holder. Note that all services that did not fall within
these two exceptions were required to “individually negotiate royalty rates with
sound recording copyright holders.” Id.
126
2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
8.21[B] (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed.); see also Duvall, supra note 101, at 270.
127
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 126, § 8.21[B].
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The DPRA created a complex, three-tiered system for
categorizing license requirements into separate rates for: (1) nonsubscription broadcasters, (2) non-interactive subscription
transmissions, and (3) interactive services.128 The licensing
requirements for each of the three categories differed, with each
being based on the extent to which the service would have an
effect on record sales and the likelihood that infringing
reproductions would be made.129
First, non-subscription broadcasters are those not controlled
or limited to certain recipients.130 Broadcasters falling into this
category—including terrestrial radio stations—are subject to the §
114(d)(1) limited public performance right. This is said to be the
“most important exemption in the DPRA,”131 in that it completely
exempts qualifying entities from “paying royalties to sound
recording copyright owners for the performance of their works.”132
That is, with the passage of the DPRA, terrestrial radio
broadcasters were given the green light to continue playing records
without having to compensate performers and record labels.
Congress chose to uphold the royalty exemption for terrestrial
radio stations, as it did not want to impose “new and unreasonable
burdens on radio . . . broadcasters, which often promote, and
appear to pose no threat to, the distribution of sound
recordings.”133 Moreover, Congress did not specifically address

128

DPRA 1995, supra note 24.
Bagdanov, supra note 30, at 142; see generally, Cardi, supra note 99.
130
S. REP. NO. 104-128, at 16 (1995).
131
Bagdanov, supra note 30, at 143.
132
Duvall, supra note 101, at 271.
133
Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 488 (3d Cir. 2003)
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-274, at 14 (1995)). Congress also noted that it
would be best to avoid “upsetting the longstanding business and contractual
relationships among record producers and performers, music composers and
129
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Internet radio technology in the DPRA, as webcasting was still an
emerging technology at the time—its potential was severely
restricted by slow Internet speeds.134 By failing to differentiate
between terrestrial radio and Internet radio, webcasting and other
non-subscription based music services offered online fell into this
first category, and were thus exempt from the requirement to pay a
royalty to sound recording copyright owners.135
Second, non-interactive subscription transmissions (e.g.
digital cable and satellite radio136) are subject to the compulsory
license found in § 114(d)(2).137 In order to provide subscriptionbased music services, such entities are required to obtain the
statutory license created under the DPRA.138 To do so, noninteractive subscription services must comply with certain
statutory conditions, which are set by an arbitration panel known
as the Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP), and adopted
by the Librarian of Congress.139 For instance, the service cannot be

publishers and broadcasters that have served all of these industries well for
decades.” H.R. REP. NO. 104-274, at 12 (1995).
134
Kellen Myers, The RIAA, the DMCA, and the Forgotten Few
Webcasters: A Call for Change in Digital Copyright Royalties, 61 FED. COMM.
L.J. 431, 439 (2009) (noting that, when the DPRA was passed, the RIAA and
Congress were most concerned about “audio on-demand” and “pay-per-listen”
interactive services online, rather than webcasting or peer-to-peer services such
as Napster).
135
Susan A. Russell, The Struggle Over Webcasting—Where is the Stream
Carrying Us?, 1 OKLA. J.L. & TECH. 13, 13 (2004) (“The Act calls for royalty
payment on digital audio transmissions offered through subscription services
such as cable and satellite . . . DPRA does not address the “issue of webcasting
or other nonsubscription based song services offered on the Internet.”).
136
Cable radio, which is similar in nature to cable television, delivers radio
signals via coaxial cable. Satellite radio, on the other hand, involves the
broadcast of signals from satellites in space.
137
17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2) (2012).
138
Castro, supra note 27, at 3.
139
Duvall, supra note 101, at 271; see also Copyright Arbitration Royalty
Panels (CARP), U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., http://www.copyright.gov/carp/ (last
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interactive, cannot pre-announce the broadcast of a particular song,
must include information about the recording being broadcast, and
is restricted in terms of the number of songs by a single artist and
the number of songs on a single album that they can play per
hour.140 If a non-interactive service provider fails to meet these
requirements, they have the arduous task of negotiating privately
with the sound recording copyright holder of each individual
recording that they wish to play.141 Importantly, the DPRA
stipulated that the compulsory license royalty rate would be set
according to a four-part standard found in 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1),142
and thus known as the 801(b) Standard. As will be seen below, the
801(b) Standard plays a key role in the debate over sound
recording public performance royalty rates.
Third, interactive services are those that enable users to
hear a particular song on-demand.143 Services that fall into this
category include websites such as Rhapsody and Grooveshark,144
visited Apr. 13, 2014) (stating “[t]he CARP system consisted of ad hoc
arbitration panels that recommended the royalty rates and distribution of royalty
fees collected under certain statutory licenses and set some of the terms and
conditions of some of the statutory licenses. Each CARP was selected for a
particular proceeding . . . and had up to 180 days to deliver its recommendation
for the rate adjustment or distribution, as the case may be. With the enactment of
the Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-419) on
Nov. 30, 2004, the Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) system that had
been part of the Copyright Office since 1993 was phased out. The Act replaced
CARP with a system of the Copyright Royalty Board (CRB).”).
140
17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2) (2012); DPRA 1995, supra note 24, § 3.
141
Bagdanov, supra note 30, at 143.
142
17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1)(A)–(D) (2012).
143
La France, supra note 76, at 230.
144
Rhapsody is an online music store, launched in 2001, and available only
in the United States. The service provides you with “the power to play exactly
the songs you want, wherever you are.” What is Rhapsody?, RHAPSODY.COM,
http://www.rhapsody.com/what-is-rhapsody/what-is-rhapsody.html (last visited
Apr. 13, 2014). Grooveshark is an online music service that lets users choose
particular songs to hear on request and create personalized song playlists. See
GROOVESHARK, http://grooveshark.com/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2014).
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which provide a list of available songs to be played immediately at
the request of the user.145 Because these providers have the greatest
potential for displacing record sales, Congress felt it necessary to
tip the balance in favor of copyright holders. Consequently,
“interactive services are responsible for the most stringent level of
copyright licensing requirements.”146 Interactive services do not
qualify for a compulsory license. Rather, the DPRA subjects them
to an exclusive right, meaning that they must negotiate licenses
with sound recording copyright holders for the on-demand
transmission of copyrighted sound recordings.147 Copyright
holders have the right to refuse to license their sound recordings to
interactive music providers, thus keeping their works from
appearing on such websites.

145

Duvall, supra note 101, at 271 (noting that terrestrial radio stations that
allow listeners to call in and request particular songs are not covered by this
definition); see also Castro, supra note 27, at 3.
146
Bagdanov, supra note 30, at 142.
147
Castro, supra note 27, at 3–4.
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• i.e. Terrestrial Broadcasters & Webcasters

NonSubscription
Broadcasters

NonInteractive
Subscription
Transmissions

Interactive
Services

• Subject to the § 114(d)(1) limited public
performance right
• Exempt from paying royalties to sound recording
copyright owners

• i.e. Digital Cable Radio & Satellite Radio
• Subject to the § 114(d)(2) compulsory license so
long as certain statutory conditions are met

• i.e. Rhapsody & Grooveshark, etc.
• Required to directly negotiate licenses with sound
recording copyright holders

Figure 2: The DPRA’s Three-Tiered Licensing Requirement
System

D. The DMCA
Although the DPRA represented significant progress in the
effort to protect the interests of sound recording copyright owners,
it certainly had its shortcomings. As noted above, webcasters were
not specifically included in the DPRA, leaving them exempt from
paying public performance royalties. This omission did not sit well
with those in the recording industry. In the years following the
enactment of the DPRA, as streaming technologies continued to
improve, the record industry grew increasingly concerned about
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the DPRA’s inability to protect their interests.148 The RIAA
complained that non-subscription webcasting services “diminished
record sales, cut into profits, and hindered growth of the recording
industry.”149 They battled with webcasters over whether such
services should qualify for the limited public performance right or
be labeled as an interactive service, thus requiring them to
individually negotiate royalties with owners of copyrights in sound
recordings.150 Ultimately, Congress sided—at least in part—with
the recording industry, resulting in a series of amendments as part
of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA).151
The DMCA addressed the issue of royalties to be paid by
webcasters for the public performance of sound recordings via
digital audio transmissions.152 Importantly, it modified § 114(d)(1)
of the Copyright Act by removing the royalty exemption for “a
non-subscription transmission other than a retransmission,” under
which non-interactive, non-subscription webcasts fell.153 By doing
so, the DMCA expanded the class of transmissions that are subject
to compulsory licenses.154 Namely, non-interactive, nonsubscription webcasters were shifted by Congress into the same
148

Day, Super Brawl, supra note 40, at 185.
Bagdanov, supra note 30, at 144.
150
Duvall, supra note 101, at 272.
151
DMCA 1998, supra note 33.
152
Id. at 2890. Note that, while not a focus of this paper, one of the effects
of the DMCA was to expand the § 112 exemption (which allows broadcasters to
make “ephemeral recordings” in order to facilitate transmissions) to include
ephemeral recordings that are made during the digital transmission of sound
recordings. The § 112 compulsory license royalty, which is determined using the
“willing buyer/willing seller” standard” (explained in Part IV.C of this paper), is
insignificant in comparison to the § 114 performance royalty. The royalties for
both licenses are typically determined together in a single rate. See Stockment,
supra note 26, at 2139; see also 17 U.S.C. § 112(e) (2012).
153
Myers, supra note 134, at 441.
154
Bagdanov, supra note 30, at 145; see 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(6), (7), (8), (11)
(2012) (non-interactive services are divided into several categories under the
DMCA, as explained in Part IV.D of this paper).
149
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category as non-interactive subscription services,155 thus making it
clear that “the compulsory license applied to all commercial, noninteractive webcasting services, regardless of their revenue
models.”156 Such webcasters became eligible for the statutory
license, so long as they met certain criteria.157 Both terrestrial radio
stations’ online rebroadcasts and “pure webcasters” thus clearly
became subject to royalty payments for the music that they
played.158 If a webcaster fails to comply with or qualify for the
statutory license, it is required to obtain a license from the
copyright holder for each song that it wishes to play.159 Congress
did not give an explanation as to why it believed non-interactive,
non-subscription services best fit into the newly expanded
category.160 Nonetheless, the compulsory license arrangement
alleviated the concerns of songwriters and music publishers, in that
it prevented record companies from refusing to license their
catalogues to non-interactive services.161 Interactive services,
meanwhile, which present the highest risk for sale displacement,162
remained ineligible for the statutory license.163

155

Pals, supra note 31, at 683.
Marshall, supra note 93, at 452.
157
17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2) (2012); see also Webcasting FAQ, RIAA, http://
web.archive.org/web/20021015121959/http://www.riaa.com/Licensing-Licen3a.cfm (last visited Apr. 13, 2014). The conditions that a webcaster must meet
in order to qualify for a statutory license include such things as: limiting the
number of songs from a single album or artist that can be played within a threehour period (known as the “sound recording performance complement”);
identifying the sound recording, album and featured artist of a song currently
being played; employing available measures to ensure that the listener does not
copy the music being broadcast over the Internet; and, refraining from
announcing songs or playlists in advance.
158
17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2) (2012); Spektor, supra note 79, at 10.
159
Russell, supra note 135, at 11.
160
Pals, supra note 31, at 683.
161
La France, supra note 76, at 231; see supra Part II.D.
162
See Arista Records, L.L.C. v. Launch Media, Inc., 578 F.3d 148, 154
(2d Cir. 2009) (citing Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for the “Digital
156
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An additional important aspect of the DMCA was that it
amended the Copyright Act by broadening the definition of an
“interactive service.”164 As webcasting technology improved, it
became increasingly clear that the DPRA’s definition of
“interactive service” was insufficient.165 Under the DPRA,
interactive services were simply those that allowed a listener to
request a specific sound recording.166 In some cases, however,
users were able to select and rate particular artists, thus creating
personalized programs in ways that were not anticipated by
Congress when they defined “interactive” in the DPRA.167
To close this loophole, the DMCA re-defined an interactive
service as “one that enables a member of the public to receive a
transmission of a program specially created for the recipient, or on
request, a transmission of a particular sound recording, whether or
not as part of a program, which is selected by or on behalf of the
recipient.”168 Under this new definition, it is no longer required
that the user personally choose what songs are played by the
webcaster. As long as the user can influence the program in such a
way that she might identify certain artists that then become the
basis of her personal program, the service would be considered

Millennium, 23 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 137, 167 (2009)). The court noted that the
more advanced information a user has about the digital transmission, the more
prepared they will be to make digital copies of the performances. Even if the
user does not make an illegal copy of the performance, by listening to the
interactive services, they are less likely to purchase copies of the sound
recordings. See id.
163
Duvall, supra note 101, at 272.
164
Bagdanov, supra note 30, at 145.
165
Id.
166
Kella, supra note 96, at 213.
167
Steven M. Marks, Entering the Sound Recording Performance Right
Labyrinth: Defining Interactive Services and the Broadcast Exemption, 20 LOY.
L.A. ENT. L. REV. 309, 314 (2000).
168
17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(D)(7) (2012).
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interactive under the statute.169 In other words, under the DMCA,
“interactive services were deemed not only to be those that allowed
users to request specific songs, but also those that provided a
program of play created especially for the listener.”170

Webcasters
Became Subject to
the Compulsory
License

The Definition of
"Interactive
Service" is
Expanded

Webcasts and
terrestrial stations'
online rebroadcasts are
required to begin
paying for the use of
sound recordings

The DPRA's definition
of "interactive service"
became insufficient in
light of new
technological
developments

Webcasters must
comply with certain
statutory conditions to
be eligible for the
compulsory license

Under the DMCA, it is
no longer required that
the user personally
choose what songs are
played in order to be
considered interactive

Figure 3: Important Changes Under the DMCA

IV. THE RATE DETERMINATION PROCEDURES
The statutory rate determination procedures for providers
of digital audio transmissions are both complex and controversial.
In this Part, I will discuss these procedures in detail. This will

169
170

Bagdanov, supra note 30, at 146.
Kella, supra note 96, at 213.
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include an examination of how the rate determination methods
have evolved over the past few years, and an analysis of the form
that they take today.
A. The Role of SoundExchange
Statutory sound recording royalties from satellite radio,
Internet radio, and digital cable music channels are paid to
SoundExchange, a non-profit PRO designated as the sole entity in
the United States authorized to collectively manage and distribute
compulsory digital performance royalties.171 It does so on behalf of
all sound recording copyright owners who join the organization. In
addition, SoundExchange is responsible for negotiating on behalf
of copyright owners in royalty rate setting proceedings. 172 The
money collected by SoundExchange is distributed to featured and
non-featured recording artists, sound recording copyright owners
(typically the record labels), and independent artists who own their
own sound recording copyright.173 SoundExchange’s authority
extends only to those digital music performances that qualify for
statutory licensing; the organization does not have authority to
negotiate or collect performance royalties on behalf of interactive
services.174 Interestingly, SoundExchange is the brainchild of the

171

17 U.S.C. § 114(g)(2)–(3) (2012); see About, SOUNDEXCHANGE, http://
www.soundexchange.com/about/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2014); see also
Bagdanov, supra note 30, at 147.
172
Stockment, supra note 26, at 2140.
173
Spektor, supra note 79, at 23 (SoundExchange divides payments
according to a consistent formula whereby the record company receives 50%,
the featured artist receives 45%, and the remaining 5% is paid to the unions
representing the non-featured musicians and non-featured vocalists); see La
France, supra note 76, at 232 (noting that, in order to make accurate
disbursements, SoundExchange must identify the specific recordings that have
been played by each music service, and how often they have been played). To
facilitate this requirement, 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2)(A)(iii) (2012) sets out that, if
technologically feasible, each sound recording should be encoded with certain
information, including the names of the featured performers.
174
Day, Super Brawl, supra note 40, at 205.
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recording industry,175 having been created as an internal division of
the RIAA in 2000, before being established as an independent nonprofit organization in September 2003.176
B. The 801(b) Standard
As noted above in Part III, the DPRA stipulated that the
compulsory license royalty rate would be set according to the
801(b) Standard.177 This standard seeks to balance the interests of
all three parties to the copyright system: the public, copyright
owners, and copyright users.178 It directs CARP179 to set royalties
so as to achieve four objectives:
(A) To maximize the availability of creative
works to the public.
(B) To afford the copyright owner a fair return
for his or her creative work and the copyright user a
fair income under existing economic conditions.
(C) To reflect the relative roles of the copyright
owner and the copyright user in the product made
available to the public with respect to relative
creative contribution, technological contribution,

175

Russell, supra note 135, at 13.
Stockment, supra note 26, at 2140.
177
The § 801(b) Standard was adopted as part of the Copyright Act of
1976. In addition to being used to determine the rates for some digital audio
broadcasts, as discussed above, the 801(b) Standard is also used to determine: (i)
performance royalties for jukeboxes (17 U.S.C. § 116); and (ii) mechanical
license royalties for making and distributing phonorecords of musical
compositions (17 U.S.C. § 115). See, e.g., Spektor, supra note 79, at 15;
Stockment, supra note 26, at 2164.
178
Stockment, supra note 26, at 2164.
179
In the DPRA, Congress stipulated that arbitrations of this kind are to be
carried out by CARP. However, in 2004, the rate-setting process was reexamined by Congress, and CARP was replaced by the Copyright Royalty
Board (CRB), which currently sets royalty rates. See infra Part IV.G.
176
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capital investment, cost, risk, and contribution to the
opening of new markets for creative expression and
media for their communication.
(D) To minimize any disruptive impact on the
structure of the industries involved and on generally
prevailing industry practices.180

The first and second policy objectives are fairly selfexplanatory. They reflect the overriding purpose of copyright law;
that is, to incentivize the production of creative works.181 The third
policy objective, however, is slightly more complex. Because it
requires consideration of “the relative roles of the copyright owner
and the copyright user” with respect to such things as “capital
investment, cost, risk, and contribution to the opening of new
markets,” it has the ability to exert downward pressure on rates.182
This is due to the fact that copyright users (i.e. the digital audio
services) often make larger investments, relative to the copyright
owners.183 The fourth policy objective, meanwhile, is the most
important of the four. It directs the arbitration panel to avoid
setting rates that would threaten to disrupt the “prevailing industry

180

17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1) (2012).
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (providing Congress with the power to
“promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries”). Note that the willing buyer/willing seller standard does not take
this overriding goal of copyright law into consideration. See infra Part IV.C.
182
John Villasenor, Digital Music Broadcast Royalties: The Case for a
Level
Playing
Field,
BROOKINGS INST.
(Aug.
7,
2012),
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2012/8/07%20music
%20royalties%20technology%20villasenor/CTI_19_Villasenor.pdf.
183
Id. For example, the cost of establishing and maintaining satellite
technology may warrant a discount from the market rate.
181
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practices” of those using the copyrighted works. This final factor
has the greatest potential to influence royalty rates.184
C. Going From the 801(b) Standard to the Willing Buyer/Willing
Seller Standard
Importantly, when the DMCA was enacted, Congress opted
to dispense with the 801(b) Standard for determining the
compulsory royalty rate. In its place, the DMCA introduced what
is known as the “willing buyer/willing seller” standard.185 The
DMCA mandates that, when webcasters and copyright owners are
unable to agree on a negotiated royalty rate, CARP is to use this
standard to “establish rates and terms that most clearly represent
the rates and terms that would have been negotiated in the
marketplace between a willing buyer and a willing seller.”186 When
deciding the rates and terms, CARP is directed to:
base [its] decision on economic, competitive
and programming information presented by the
parties, including—
(i) whether use of the service may substitute for
or may promote the sales of phonorecords or
otherwise may interfere with or may enhance the
sound recording copyright owner’s other streams of
revenue from its sound recordings; and
(ii) the relative roles of the copyright owner and
the transmitting entity in the copyrighted work and
the service made available to the public with respect

184

Id.
Stockment, supra note 79, at 2166 (also noting that the legislative
history does not provide any explanation as to why Congress adopted this new
standard for Internet radio).
186
17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B) (2012); DMCA 1998, supra note 33, at 2895–
96.
185
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to relative creative contribution, technological
contribution, capital investment, cost, and risk.187

Replacing the 801(b) Standard with the willing
buyer/willing seller standard threatened to drastically increase the
royalty rates paid by digital broadcasters. This is because the
willing buyer/willing seller standard, unlike the 801(b) Standard,
lacks broad underlying policy considerations that have the
potential to produce below-market rates. Naturally, digital satellite
and digital cable services, fearing that a market-based rate would
cause a major disruption to their business models, lobbied against
any changes to the rates. By the time deliberations leading up to
the DMCA took place, digital satellite and digital cable services
“had amassed enough political support to oppose total adoption of
the willing buyer/willing seller standard.”188 Much to the detriment
of sound recording copyright holders, a two-tier royalty rate
structure was thus born.189
D. The Double Standard
The two-tier royalty rate structure stems from the fact that,
under the DMCA, services that provide non-interactive digital
audio transmissions are divided into four categories, and are
subject to two different rates. Companies that fall under the
definition of “preexisting satellite digital audio radio service”190

187

17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B)(i)–(ii) (2012).
Marshall, supra note 93, at 452.
189
Id.
190
17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(10) (2012). A “preexisting satellite digital audio
radio service” is defined under the DMCA as follows: “a subscription satellite
digital audio radio service provided pursuant to a satellite digital audio radio
service license issued by the Federal Communications Commission on or before
July 31, 1998, and any renewal of such license to the extent of the scope of the
original license, and may include a limited number of sample channels
188
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(e.g. Sirius XM) and those which provide a “preexisting
subscription service”191 (e.g. digital cable radio services Music
Choice and Muzak), are grandfathered to the 801(b) Standard.
Meanwhile, services classified as “new subscription services,”192
and
those
that
broadcast
“eligible
non-subscription
transmissions”193 (i.e. Internet radio) have their rates set according

representative of the subscription service that are made available on a
nonsubscription basis in order to promote the subscription service.” Id.
191
17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(11) (2012). A “preexisting subscription service” is
defined under the DMCA as follows: “a service that performs sound recordings
by means of noninteractive audio-only subscription digital audio transmissions,
which was in existence and was making such transmissions to the public for a
fee on or before July 31, 1998, and may include a limited number of sample
channels representative of the subscription service that are made available on a
nonsubscription basis in order to promote the subscription service.” Id.
192
17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(8) (2012). A “new subscription service” is defined
under the DMCA as follows: “a service that performs sound recordings by
means of noninteractive subscription digital audio transmissions and that is not a
preexisting subscription service or a preexisting satellite digital audio radio
service.” Id. Note that these services perform exactly the same function as
“preexisting subscription services,” yet are subject to a less favorable royalty
rate determination standard for the sole reason that they did not exist prior to
1998. See David Oxenford, Another Proposed Settlement of Another Copyright
Royalty Board Proceeding—New Subscription Services, BROADCAST L. BLOG
(Nov. 9, 2007), http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/2007/11/articles/intellectualproperty/another-proposed-settlement-of-another-copyright-royalty-boardproceeding-new-subscription-services/ (“The covered "new subscription
services" have agreed to pay the greater of 15% of revenue or a per subscriber
fee that will escalate over the 5 years that the agreement is in effect.”).
193
17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(6) (2012). An “eligible nonsubscription
transmission” is defined under the DMCA as follows: “a noninteractive
nonsubscription digital audio transmission not exempt under subsection (d)(1)
that is made as part of a service that provides audio programming consisting, in
whole or in part, of performances of sound recordings, including retransmissions
of broadcast transmissions, if the primary purpose of the service is to provide to
the public such audio or other entertainment programming, and the primary
purpose of the service is not to sell, advertise, or promote particular products or
services other than sound recordings, live concerts, or other music-related
events.” Id.
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to the willing buyer/willing seller standard.194 By modifying the
categories in this way, the DMCA’s impact on royalty rates has
been profound.195 Because of the substantially different policy
objectives underlying the two standards, they naturally lead to
drastically different royalty rates. In fact, the application of the two
different standards to different services is “the single biggest factor
in explaining the wide variations in rates paid today.”196
The categorization of digital audio transmissions created
under the DMCA limits access to the more favorable 801(b)
Standard to digital broadcasters that were “preexisting” on July 31,
1998. There is currently only a very small number of digital music
broadcasting services that qualify under this standard: namely,
Sirius XM, Music Choice, and Muzak.197 These services benefit
greatly from having their royalty rate determined according to the
flexible 801(b) Standard, rather than by the strict marketplace test
of the willing buyer/willing seller standard.198 As will be shown
below, the royalty rate that they pay is substantially lower than that
which webcasters are subject to.

194

Marshall, supra note 93, at 453; see Stockment, supra note 26, at 2164.
Villasenor, supra note 182, at 4–5.
196
Id. at 5.
197
Id. at 6; see Marshall, supra note 93, at 457.
198
See Carey, supra note 90, at 302.
195
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Figure 4: The Two-Tier Royalty Rate Structure
E. The CARP Procedures: Webcaster I
Internet radio webcasts generally do not fall under the
DMCA’s definition of “interactive service.”199 Rather, as noted
above, they generally fall within the non-interactive category, thus
making them eligible for the statutory license.200 To set the

199

This precedent was established by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
in Arista, which determined how the “interactivity” provision of the DMCA
applies to webcasting companies. Interactivity is gauged by the level of control
the audience has in selecting or re-listening to specific tracks. See Arista
Records, L.L.C. v. Launch Media, Inc., 578 F.3d 148, 164 (2d Cir. 2009);
Bagdanov, supra note 30, at 146.
200
Spektor, supra note 79, at 18, 30; see Bagdanov, supra note 30, at 147
(noting that the DMCA requires that Internet webcasters obtain licenses and pay
royalties to the PROs (who represent the compositional copyright owners) and
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statutory royalty rate, the DMCA provides for voluntary
negotiations between sound recording owners and digital music
services.201 However, if voluntary negotiations fail to result in an
agreement after a 60-day statutory period, the DMCA mandates
that the DPRA’s CARP procedures should be used to set rates and
terms for the compulsory license.202 Thus, it is only when industrywide negotiations fail to result in agreement that the parties are
forced to litigate the rate before a government-appointed panel.203
Following the enactment of the DMCA, a small number of
webcasters reached voluntary licensing agreements with the RIAA.
In order to determine an industry-wide rate for the remaining
webcasters with whom negotiations had broken down, the RIAA,
in 1999, petitioned the Librarian of Congress to convene CARP.204
Several years later, in February 2002, CARP’s royalty rate
determination (Webcaster I) was released.205 In Webcaster I,
CARP adopted the RIAA’s proposal for a per-performance royalty
model (i.e. every time a sound recording is streamed to a listener),
rather than the webcaster-supported percentage-of-revenue

to SoundExchange, which represents the owners of the sound recording
copyrights).
201
DMCA 1998, supra note 33, at 2895–96; see Marshall, supra note 93, at
453.
202
Duvall, supra note 101, at 272.
203
Marshall, supra note 93, at 453.
204
Carey, supra note 90, at 276–77.
205
Rate Setting for Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and
Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No. 2000-9 CARP DTRA 1 & 2 (Copyright Arb.
Royalty Panel Feb. 20, 2002) [hereinafter Webcaster 1 CARP Report], available
at
http://www.copyright.gov/carp/webcasting_rates.pdf.
CARP’s
report
recommended rates and terms for two compulsory licenses: (i) for eligible nonsubscription services to perform sound recordings publicly by means of digital
audio transmissions (i.e. webcasting) under 17 U.S.C. § 114; and (ii) to make
ephemeral recordings of sound recordings under the statutory license set forth in
17 U.S.C. § 112. Id. at 1–2. The CARP recommendation set royalty rates for
webcasters retroactively from October 1998 through until December 2002. Id. at
2.
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model.206 However, because some services at the time did not
possess the requisite software or technical expertise to accurately
calculate the number of individual performances, CARP adopted
the RIAA’s recommendation to temporarily allow statutory
licensees to reasonably estimate their usage of sound recordings.207
As such, all commercial webcasters (who did not qualify as “small
commercial webcasters”) were permitted to calculate royalties
using an aggregate tuning hours (ATH) method, “whereby one
listener who listens for one hour would constitute one aggregate
tuning hour, two listeners who each listen for a half an hour would
also be one aggregate tuning hour, and so on.”208
The CARP royalty rate recommendations were as follows:
0.07 cents per performance per listener for radio retransmissions
by commercial webcasters,209 0.14 cents for Internet-only
transmissions,210 and 0.02 cents per performance for noncommercial webcasters.211 To arrive at its determination, CARP
used a willing buyer/willing seller model based largely on a
voluntary agreement reached between the RIAA and Yahoo!, Inc.,
which involved a lump sum payment of $1.25 million dollars for
the first one and a half billion transmissions (including Internetonly transmissions and radio retransmissions).212 CARP was fully

206

Duvall, supra note 101, at 273.
Webcaster 1 CARP Report, supra note 205, at 109.
208
Cydney A. Tune, Webcaster Music Royalty Rates—In Flux and on the
Rise, PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP (June 15, 2007), http://
www.pillsburylaw.com/siteFiles/Publications/
5EA3137178E2E2204487E5B973E75B47.pdf.
209
Webcaster 1 CARP Report, supra note 205, at 84.
210
Id. at 88. CARP based the disparate price treatment between radio
retransmissions and Internet-only transmissions on the conclusion that over-theair radio play has a “tremendous promotional impact on phonorecord sales” that
Internet-only transmissions do not provide. See id. at 75.
211
Id. at 94.
212
Robert J. Delchin, Musical Copyright Law: Past, Present and Future of
Online Music Distribution, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 343, 376 (2004).
207
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aware that implementing such high rates would eliminate many
small and medium sized webcasters. In fact, the Panel stated that
the webcasting community at the time had an over-abundance of
“marginal and insignificant entities”213 and that increasing the rates
was desirable in that it would bring about market consolidation.
This in turn would result in a far smaller number of viable
webcasters, all of which would be able to endure and prosper, and
afford significantly higher royalty payments to copyright
owners.214
Not surprisingly, Webcaster I was “met with fierce
opposition from small webcasters, who argued that the willing
buyer/willing seller model used by CARP was far too broad to
adequately differentiate between larger commercial webcasters
such as Yahoo! and smaller mom-and-pop commercial
webcasters.”215 To protest the new fees and accounting procedures,
which small webcasters saw as having the potential to kill Internet
radio, a “Day of Silence” was staged.216 The Librarian of
Congress, who, at the time, was authorized to review CARP
decisions, subsequently intervened in the matter, but largely
adopted the Panel’s determinations. For instance, he agreed that
the RIAA/Yahoo! deal served as the best model for an agreement
that would have been negotiated in the marketplace between a
willing buyer and willing seller.217 He disagreed, however, with
CARP’s finding that royalty rates for Internet-only webcasters and
webcasters who retransmitted radio broadcasts should be set
differently.218 Consequently, he set a rate of 0.07 cents per

213

Webcaster 1 CARP Report, supra note 205, at 52.
Id.
215
Day, Super Brawl, supra note 40, at 188.
216
Duvall, supra note 101, at 275.
217
Determination of Reasonable Rates and Terms for the Digital
Performance of Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 67 Fed. Reg.
45,240, 45,259 (July 8, 2002) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 261).
218
Id. at 45,255.
214
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performance, per listener for all eligible non-subscription
transmissions by commercial webcasters,219 and kept the rate for
non-commercial webcasters at 0.02 cents per performance.220
F. The Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002
As expected, the high compulsory royalty rates imposed by
Webcaster I forced many small commercial webcasters out of
business.221 Others, desperate for change, petitioned Congress for
help. In response to their pleas, Congress enacted the Small
Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002 (SWSA).222 The SWSA
provided non-commercial and small commercial webcasters223
additional time to negotiate with sound recording copyright owners
(represented by SoundExchange). This resulted in a compromise
being reached in 2002, whereby commercial webcasters would pay
rates based on a percentage of their gross revenue, while noncommercial webcasters were to pay a flat annual fee, subject to a
number of restrictions.224 The SWSA garnered general approval
219

Id.
Id. at 45,259.
221
Carey, supra note 90, at 278.
222
Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-321, 116 Stat.
2780 (2002).
223
Notification of Agreement Under the Small Webcaster Settlement Act
of 2002, 67 Fed. Reg. 78,510, 78,513 (Dec. 24, 2002) (an “eligible small
webcaster” is defined based on a revenue scale that is graduated by calendar
year and, under the 2004 definition, a small webcaster is one whose revenues do
not exceed $1.25 million per year); see Carey, supra note 90, at 280.
224
Notification of Agreement Under the Small Webcaster Settlement Act
of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 35,008, 35,010 (June 11, 2003); see Day, Super Brawl,
supra note 40, at 189. The SWSA created a special royalty option for small
commercial entities (i.e. webcasters with less than $1.2 million in revenue),
allowing them to pay the higher of (1) 10% of their revenue on the first
$250,000 and 12% thereafter, or (2) 7% of their expenses. In addition, under the
SWSA, other categories of webcasters, such as non-commercial and non-music
webcasters, were subject to different rates than commercial webcasters. On the
one hand, non-commercial webcasters were to pay a minimum rate of $500 a
year, which allowed them to stream to an average of 200 simultaneous listeners
220
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from both sides of the debate.225 Small webcasters and noncommercial groups, in particular, felt that the Webcaster I rates
would have put them out of business had it not been for the
agreement reached under the SWSA.226 Finally, “after four years
of negotiation, arbitration, and Congressional intervention, a
temporary peace [had fallen] over the digital performance right
battlefield.”227 However, in 2005, when the negotiated license
terms came to an end, so did the period of relative calm. The brawl
was set to begin anew.228
G. The 2007 CRB Decision – Webcaster II
Following the highly controversial rate setting procedure in
Webcaster I, various parties complained to Congress about the
CARP arbitration system.229 In order to appease webcasters’
requests to modify the statutory rate-setting process, Congress
enacted the Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of
2004.230 This Act replaced CARP with the Copyright Royalty

or 146,000 aggregate monthly tuning hours (ATH). Once those limits are met,
the non-commercial webcaster would pay royalties on any excess streaming,
either on a per-performance basis (.0002176 cents per performance) or on the
basis of aggregate tuning hours (.00251 cents per ATH). Non-music webcasters
(i.e. those who primarily broadcast news, talk and/or sports), on the other hand,
were to pay a reduced rate of .000762 cents per performance or per ATH. Tune,
supra note 208, at 2.
225
Carey, supra note 90, at 279.
226
David D. Oxenford, Copyright Royalty Board Releases Music Royalties
for Internet Radio Streaming for 2006-2010—Clarifying the Confusion, ALA.
BROADCASTERS ASS’N, (Apr. 12, 2007), www.al-ba.com/crb.doc [hereinafter
Oxenford April 2007].
227
Day, Super Brawl, supra note 40, at 189.
228
Id.
229
Carey, supra note 90, at 283 (the CARP was criticized for being made
up of inexperienced decision-makers, and that the decisions were “unpredictable
and inconsistent”).
230
17 U.S.C. § 801 (2012); see Marshall, supra note 93, at 454.
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Board (CRB), a panel consisting of three full-time Copyright
Royalty Judges.231
On February 16, 2005, the newly formed CRB commenced
proceedings to determine new rates and terms for the § 114
statutory license of sound recordings for webcasters.232 Just over
two years later, on March 2, 2007, the Board released its first
ruling (Webcaster II). The decision, which was to cover the
licensing period from January 1, 2006 through December 31, 2010,
proved to be highly controversial, resulting in significant backlash
from webcasters.233 Despite Congress’ attempts to reform the
royalty rate setting system by replacing CARP with the CRB, the
result of Webcaster II “was eerily reminiscent” to that of
Webcaster I.234 Whereas Webcaster I faced its strongest opposition

231

Castro, supra note 27, at 4. The Copyright Royalty Board (CRB)
determines rates and terms for the copyright statutory licenses and makes
determinations on distribution of statutory license royalties collected by the
Copyright Office. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 139. The Copyright
Royalty Judges (CRJs) are full-time employees in the Library, and are appointed
for six-year terms, with an opportunity for reappointment. Id. The first three
judges serve two-, four- and six-year terms in order to avoid a situation where
all three judges are replaced at the same time. Id.
232
In addition to setting rates and terms for the § 114 webcaster
performance license, the CRB also set rates and terms for the § 112 ephemeral
license. See Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral
Recordings, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,085 (May 1, 2007) (codified at 37 C.F.R.
pt. 380).
233
Bagdanov, supra note 30, at 147.
234
Oxenford April 2007, supra note 226, at 2–3. Under the CARP system,
decisions regarding royalties were made by a panel of arbitrators. Id. The
arbitration system was highly criticized by those who believed that the Panel—
whose members could change after each royalty proceeding—lacked
institutional knowledge. Id. Moreover, the process was very costly for
participants, who were required to pay the costs of the arbitrators in the
proceeding. Id. Whereas the CRB system allowed for continuity among the
Judges sitting on the Board, and eliminated the costs of the arbitrators, it added
discovery (document production, interrogatories and depositions) to the process.
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from small webcasters and non-commercial groups, Webcaster II
was met with vehement disapproval from virtually all webcasters
involved in the proceedings.235 It was believed that the high
royalties imposed by the CRB would quickly put many Internet
radio stations—large and small, commercial and noncommercial—out of business.236
As noted above, the SWSA spared webcasters from having
to pay according to the per-performance royalty scheme
recommended by CARP in Webcaster I. However, to the detriment
of webcasters, the Webcaster II decision re-implemented a perperformance royalty calculation system, drastically changing the
methodology that was used to calculate royalty rates under the
SWSA.237 The decision mandated that all commercial
webcasters238—including those previously categorized as small
commercial webcasters239 or non-music webcasters—would be
required to calculate royalties at the same per-performance rate.240
The new rates for all commercial webcasters were set as
follows: .0008 cents per performance in 2006 (applied
retroactively), .0011 cents per performance in 2007, .0014 cents
per performance in 2008, .0018 cents per performance in 2009,
and .0019 cents per performance in 2010.241 Moreover, the
Id. Despite these changes, the CRB’s 2007 decision was very similar in result to
CARP’s 2002 decision, and was thus highly criticized. Id.
235
Id.
236
Carey, supra note 90, at 284.
237
Tune, supra note 208, at 2.
238
See Bagdanov, supra note 30, at 148 n.108. “Commercial webcaster” is
synonymous with “eligible nonsubscription transmission”; see also supra Part
IV.D.
239
Tune, supra note 208, at 2 (Small commercial webcasters are those with
less than $1.2 million in annual revenue).
240
Id. at 4.
241
Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral
Recordings, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,096 (May 1, 2007) (to be codified at 37
C.F.R. pt. 380).
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decision set a minimum annual fee of $500 per “channel” or
“station” for commercial broadcasters.242 The terms “channel” and
“station,” however, were not clearly defined, creating some
confusion with respect to services that create individualized
playlists for listeners. If each stream were to be treated as a unique
“channel,” those webcasters who produce a unique stream every
time a listener logs into their site faced massive costs.243
Year

Fee Per Performance
(U.S. dollars)

2006

.0008

2007

.0011

38%

2008

.0014

27%

2009

.0018

29%

2010

.0019

6%

Percent Increase
Over Prior Year
-

Figure 5: Webcaster II Performance Royalty Fee Schedule for
Commercial Webcasters244
Perhaps the most striking feature of Webcaster II was its
treatment of small commercial webcasters. By eliminating the
option under the SWSA that allowed small webcasters “to pay a
percentage of their revenue in lieu of a per-performance royalty
fee,”245 Webcaster II forced small webcasters to pay the same
royalty rates as larger companies with deeper pockets.246 Non-

242

Id. at 24,097.
Oxenford April 2007, supra note 226, at 2.
244
Castro, supra note 27, at 5.
245
Id. at 6.
246
The CRB opted to eliminate the separate status for small webcasters
under Webcaster I using the rationale that allowing “inefficient market
participants to continue to use as much music as they want and for as long a time
period as they want without compensating copyright owners on the same basis
as more efficient market participants trivializes the property rights of copyright
owners.” Moreover, the CRB noted that it “cannot guarantee a profitable
business to every market entrant” and that “the normal free market processes
243
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commercial webcasters,247 meanwhile, continued to be treated as a
separate category under the CRB scheme. However, the basis on
which they were to pay royalties changed. Webcaster II mandated
that non-commercial webcasters would pay a minimum annual fee
of $500 per channel or station, which allowed them to conduct
digital audio transmissions of up to 159,140 ATH per month.
Should a non-commercial webcaster exceed the limit in any given
month, it would be required to pay additional royalties for digital
audio transmissions in excess of the cap at the same rate as that
paid by commercial webcasters.248
To arrive at their royalty rate determination, the CRB, as
directed by statute, applied the willing buyer/willing seller
standard.249 First, they constructed the hypothetical marketplace in
which the “buyers” and “sellers” negotiated a price for the
“product.” The CRB defined “sellers” as record companies, the
“buyers” as webcasters in a market where no compulsory license
exists, and the “product” as a blanket license permitting the buyers
to make digital audio transmissions of the record companies’

typically weed out those entities that have poor business models or are
inefficient.” See Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral
Recordings, Docket No. 2005-1 CRB DTRA (Copyright Royalty Board),
available at http://www.loc.gov/crb/proceedings/2005-1/final-rates-terms20051.pdf.
247
Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral
Recordings, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,098 (Non-commercial webcasters are non-profit
entities with the mission of providing “educational, cultural, religious and social
programming not generally available on commercial venues.” Moreover, they
“have different sources of funding than ad-supported commercial webcasters—
such as listener donations, corporate underwriting or sponsorships, and
university funds.”); see Duvall, supra note 101, at 280; Bagdanov, supra note
30, at 148.
248
Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral
Recordings, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,100.
249
17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B) (2012).
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complete repertoire of sound recordings.250 As a benchmark for
setting the new rates, the CRB looked to an analysis of seventeen
contracts between interactive webcasters and the recording
industry.251 This evidence, which was presented by one of
SoundExchange’s expert witnesses, was accepted despite the fact
that it was based on services that are inherently different.252 As
noted above, interactive services, which allow audiences to choose
which songs will be played in a stream, do not qualify for statutory
licensing, and must negotiate privately with record labels for the
right to use their sound recordings. Whereas virtually all of the
interactive services used to formulate the benchmark are
subscription-based services, most of the non-interactive webcasters
subject to the statutory rate are free, advertising-supported
companies.253 Nonetheless, the CRB rejected arguments that
interactive services were too dissimilar to be used as an appropriate
benchmark, finding that the expert witness had appropriately
adjusted for differences in interactivity.254 Namely, rates were
adjusted to take into account the fact that non-interactive services
offer less value to consumers, in that consumers are unable to
select songs when using such a service.255

250

Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral
Recordings, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,087; see Mark D. Robertson, Sparing Internet
Radio from the Real Threat of the Hypothetical Marketplace, 10 VAND. J. ENT.
& TECH. L. 543, 545 (2008).
251
Castro, supra note 27, at 5. Note, however, that the CRB rejected
proposals by webcasters to use as a benchmark the rates webcasters pay to PROs
such as ASCAP and BMI for the digital performance of the musical
compositions underlying sound recordings. The proposal was rejected on the
basis that “evidence shows that sound recording rights are paid multiple times
the amounts paid for musical works.” See 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, supra note 232,
at 24,094.
252
Carey, supra note 90, at 287–88.
253
Oxenford April 2007, supra note 226, at 3.
254
Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral
Recordings, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,092.
255
Oxenford April 2007, supra note 226, at 3.
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Not surprisingly, Webcaster II was met with immediate and
fierce opposition. The rate increases were so dramatic that even the
largest commercial webcasters, such as Yahoo! and Pandora,
expressed intentions to shut down their businesses if the rates
remained in effect.256 Pandora, for instance, which offers
thousands of channels without subscription fees, faced the prospect
of skyrocketing royalty bills under the new CRB rules. The
company estimated that, in 2008 alone, it would be required to pay
$18 million in royalties, out of its expected $25 million in
revenue—not including separate royalties to be paid to
songwriters.257 This figure would be enough to force the webcaster
out of business.258
Although large webcasters faced potential rate increases
estimated at between 40% and 70% of revenues, it was small
webcasters who were most affected by the CRB decision.259 It was
estimated that small webcasters would face royalty increases
equivalent to as much as 1200% of revenues, forcing most—if not
all—out of business.260 Rather than account for the “disparate,
nuanced financial realities of the evolving [webcasting] industry,”
the CRB decision “subjected all webcasters to the same perperformance royalty metric,” thus threatening to bury many of
them “under the weight of the rate increase.”261 Webcasters argued
that, during the two years of litigation leading up to Webcaster II,
the significant rate increases advocated for by SoundExchange,
and subsequently adopted by the CRB, were nothing more than a

256

Meg Tirrell, Yahoo, AOL May Abandon Web Radio After Royalties Rise
(Update2), BLOOMBERG (Nov. 28, 2007), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a0pKOrcpw6yE.
257
Tim Bajarin, Saving Internet Radio, PC MAGAZINE (Oct. 3, 2008), http:/
/www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2331595,00.asp.
258
Id.
259
Tune, supra note 208, at 4.
260
Id.
261
Robertson, supra note 250, at 546.
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“major label money grab—an attempt to revive a dying business
model through exorbitant fee increases at the expense of
technological developments and consumer interests.”262
H. The Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008 and The Pureplay
Agreement
Despite the swift and vehement objections to Webcaster II,
the CRB, on April 16, 2007, issued an Order denying all requests
for a rehearing.263 Several weeks later, on May 1, 2007, the Board
issued its final determination, at which point the rates became
immediately effective.264 In response to the rallying cries of
webcasters, Congress, as it did following CARP’s controversial
Webcaster I decision in 2002, opted to intervene. They did so by
passing the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008 (WSA 2008),265
which sent the Digital Media Association (DiMA) (the national
trade organization representing webcasters) into negotiations with
SoundExchange.266 Under the WSA 2008, the parties were given
until February 15, 2009, to negotiate royalty rates to replace the
compulsory license rates determined by the CRB in Webcaster
II.267 The WSA 2008 permitted parties to agree on royalty rates for

262

Kevin C. Parks, Black Hole or Celestial Jukebox? Section 114 and the
Future of Music, LANDSLIDE, Nov.–Dec. 2008, at 46, 49; Bagdanov, supra note
30, at 149.
263
Tune, supra note 208, at 2–3. In the same Order, however, the CRB
amended its initial decision, allowing for a transitional option for the years 2006
and 2007, during which time webcasters could continue to use ATH as a basis
for calculation of the royalties owed. Id. The CRB also set a July 15th, 2007,
payment deadline for retroactive royalties for 2006, and refused to stay
implementation of the new rates and terms until all administrative appeals and
judicial review were complete. Id.
264
Stockment, supra note 26, at 2144.
265
Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-435, 122 Stat. 4974
(2008) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 114) [hereinafter WSA of 2008].
266
Day, Super Brawl, supra note 40, at 191.
267
Bagdanov, supra note 30, at 151–52.
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a period of up to eleven years, beginning on January 1, 2005.268
Negotiations, however, failed to produce an agreement by the
February 15, 2009, deadline,269 prompting Congress to issue the
Webcaster Settlement Act of 2009 (WSA 2009),270 which amended
the WSA 2008, and gave the parties thirty additional days to
negotiate.271 The extension granted under the WSA 2009 provided
enough time for SoundExchange and many webcasters, including
Pandora, to successfully reach an agreement (Pureplay
Agreement).272
The Pureplay Agreement was concluded between
SoundExchange and a group of webcasters on July 7, 2009.273 It
set rates for the period beginning on January 1, 2006, and ending
on December 31, 2015,274 and is available as an alternative to the
Webcaster II rates to any commercial webcaster who meets the
eligibility conditions of the agreement and chooses to opt-in.275
Namely, eligible webcasters must qualify as “pureplay
webcasters”—that is, “those that are willing to include their entire
gross revenue in a percentage of revenue calculation to determine

268

WSA of 2008, supra note 265, at § 2.
Bagdanov, supra note 30, at 152.
270
Webcaster Settlement Agreement of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-36, 123 Stat.
1926 (codified as amended in 17 U.S.C. § 114) [hereinafter WSA 2009].
271
Id. at § 2.
272
Notification of Agreements Under the Webcaster Settlement Act of
2009, 74 Fed. Reg. 34,796 (July 17, 2009) [hereinafter Pureplay Agreement];
see Day, Super Brawl, supra note 40, at 191; David Oxenford, Pureplay
Webcasters and SoundExchange Enter Into Deal Under Webcaster Settlement
Act to Offer Internet Radio Royalty Rate Alternative for 2006-2015, BROADCAST
L. BLOG (July 7, 2009), http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/2009/07/articles/
internet-radio/pureplay-webcasters-and-soundexchange-enter-into-deal-underwebcaster-settlement-act-to-offer-internet-radio-royalty-rate-alternative-for2006-2015 [hereinafter Oxenford July 7].
273
Pureplay Agreement, supra note 272, at 34,797.
274
Id. at 34,798.
275
Id. at 34,797.
269
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their royalties”276 and “whose primary business is to transmit
sound recordings under the statutory license, and not to sell or
promote any other service or product.”277 The Pureplay Agreement
creates royalty rates for three separate categories: (1) “commercial
webcasters” (those with annual revenues of $1.25 million or more),
(2) “small pureplay webcasters” (commercial webcasters with
$1.25 million or less in revenue), and (3) “subscription services”
(webcasters that charge a subscription fee for access).278
For commercial webcasters, the rates under the Pureplay
Agreement are far preferable to those under Webcaster II. 279 Under
the new deal, these large webcasters must pay SoundExchange the
greater of 25% of gross revenue or a per performance royalty rate
starting at .0008 cents per play in 2006 and increasing to .0014
cents per play in 2015.280 Despite being a better deal than
Webcaster II, commercial webcasters that opt-in to the Pureplay
Agreement are still subject to extremely high royalty burdens. For
example, during the first fiscal quarter of 2013, which ended on
April 30, 2012, Pandora’s total content acquisition costs were
$55.8 million, corresponding to 69% of their reported revenues of
$80.78 million.281 It is estimated that, of the $55.8 million in
royalty fees, $52.2 million constitutes sound recording
performance royalty payments to SoundExchange.282 Small
276

Oxenford July 7, supra note 272.
Rising
Tides,
FUTURE
OF
MUSIC
COAL.,
http://www.futureofmusic.org/issues/campaigns/rising-tides (last visited Apr.
30, 2014).
278
Pureplay Agreement, supra note 272, at 34,797; Stockment, supra note
26, at 2151.
279
Oxenford July 7, supra note 272.
280
Villasenor, supra note 182, at 11.
281
Press Release, Pandora Media, Inc., Pandora Reports 1Q13 Financial
Results (May 23, 2012), available at http://investor.pandora.com/
phoenix.zhtml?c=227956&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1699251&highlight=.
282
Villasenor, supra note 182, at 11–12. As a comparison, if Pandora were
paying royalties according to the Webcaster II rates, their sound recording
277
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pureplay webcasters, meanwhile, must pay the greater of either: (1)
a percentage of gross revenues, ranging from 10% to 14%; or, (2)
7% of expenses during the applicable year.283 The small pureplay
option, however, is only available for the period from 2006 to
2014.284 Finally, subscription services are required to pay on a perperformance basis, at a rate ranging from .0008 cents in 2006
to .0025 cents in 2015.285 Pureplay webcasters that did not opt into
the Pureplay Agreements remain subject to the CRB’s royalty
rates.286
The Pureplay Agreement was widely hailed as having
saved Internet radio.287 Although it allowed Pandora and other
webcasters to continue streaming, it is far from a perfect solution,
with at least one webcaster noting that it will prevent the Internet
radio industry from prospering, “to a nearly fatal degree.”288
performance licenses in 2012 would be tens of millions of dollars higher than
under the Pureplay Agreement, thus approaching or exceeding their revenue for
the year. Id. Whereas, under the Pureplay Agreement, the non-subscription 2012
rate for large pureplay commercial webcasters is .0011 cents per performance,
the corresponding 2012 rate under Webcaster II is .0021 cents. Id.
283
Pureplay Agreement, supra note 272, at 34,799–800.
284
Bagdanov, supra note 30, at 153; see Oxenford July 7, supra note 272.
Small webcasters who elect to join the deal must do so on a yearly
basis. Because the deal does not offer a small pureplay webcaster percentage of
revenue option for 2015, the ability to opt out is important for the smaller
webcaster who has not reached the $1.25 million cap by that time. In 2015, such
a webcaster may choose to opt-in to what is known as the “Microcaster Deal” –
a deal reached between SoundExchange and a number of very small webcasters
whereby webcasters pay 12% on the first $250,000 of revenue.
285
Pureplay Agreement, supra note 272, at 34,799.
286
Pals, supra note 31, at 688. Note that, in 2011, the CRB set out its
proposed webcast royalty rates for the period beginning in 2011 and ending in
2015. See Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral
Recordings, 75 Fed. Reg. 16,377 (April 1, 2010).
287
Stockment, supra note 26, at 2153.
288
Rob Pegoraro, Web Radio Royalties Resolved*, THE WASHINGTON POST
(July 8, 2009), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/fasterforward/2009/07/
web_radio_royalties_resolved_1.html.
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Moreover, it is not a permanent solution to the problem.
SoundExchange itself has stated that it views the Pureplay
Agreement “as an experimental structure,” and that it “does not
consider [the] terms indicative of fair market rates.”289 It goes
without saying that the future of Internet radio is thus highly
uncertain.
V. A COMPARISON OF THE TWO STANDARDS
As noted above, application of the two standards leads to
drastically different royalty rate determinations. Whereas Internet
radio companies—which are subject to the willing buyer/willing
seller standard—are required to pay § 114 performance license
royalties that approach or even exceed 100% of revenues, 290 those
grandfathered to the 801(b) Standard pay far less. These “preexisting” satellite radio and digital cable radio services—namely,
Sirius XM, Music Choice and Muzak—pay a revenue-based sound
recording performance royalty that amounts to only 6% to 8% of
revenues.291
These vastly different rates stem from the fact that the two
standards have strikingly different underlying policy objectives.
On the one hand, the 801(b) Standard: (i) seeks to balance the
interests of the public, copyright owners and copyright users; (ii)
takes into consideration the goal of copyright policy in fostering
the availability of creative works to the public; (iii) takes into
consideration the value provided by the copyright user in bringing
the copyrighted works to the public; and, (iv) directs the CRB to
avoid setting royalty rates that would have a disruptive impact on

289

SoundExchange and “PurePlay” Webcasters Reach Unprecedented
Experimental Rate Agreement, SOUNDEXCHANGE (July 7, 2009), http://
www.soundexchange.com/pr/soundexchange-and-pureplay-webcasters-reachunprecedented-experimental-rate-agreement/.
290
Stockment, supra note 26, at 2160.
291
Id. at 2158; see Carey, supra note 90, at 302.
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the industry using the copyrighted works.292 When the CRB sets a
rate according to the 801(b) Standard, it will first establish a
benchmark “marketplace” royalty rate, and then proceed to
consider what influence—if any—each of the 801(b) factors
should have in altering that starting point rate.293 For example, in
the CRB’s December 2007 determination of the royalty rates to be
paid by Sirius XM,294 the Board began by establishing a reasonable
estimate of what would be paid in the marketplace, finding that
13% of subscriber revenues should serve as the “upper boundary
for a zone of reasonableness.”295 The Board then proceeded to chip
away at that upper limit, ultimately concluding that the rates
should start at 6% of gross revenue for 2006, and increase
gradually to 8% in 2012.296 The 801(b) Standard’s fourth
objective, in particular, played a key role in exerting downward
pressure on the 13% upper limit.297 Specifically, by taking into
consideration the harmful effects that a high royalty rate might
have on the satellite radio industry, the CRB eventually decided on
fees which pale in comparison to those paid by webcasters.
In contrast, the two factors enumerated in the willing
buyer/willing seller standard are “explicitly not to be used as a
basis for adjusting rates.”298 CARP, in 2002, stated that the two
factors—namely, (i) the service’s effect on phonorecord sales and
other streams of revenue of the copyright owner; and, (ii) the
relative roles of the copyright owner and the transmitting entity—
292

Stockment, supra note 26, at 2164.
Villasenor, supra note 182, at 8.
294
At the time of the proceedings, Sirius and XM were separate entities.
They later merged in July 2008, and the new entity retained its status as a
“preexisting service.” See id. at 7.
295
Determination of Rates and Terms for Preexisting Subscription Services
and Satellite Digital Audio Radio Services, 73 Fed. Reg. 4080, 4094 (Jan. 24,
2008).
296
Id. at 4098.
297
Villasenor, supra note 182, at 8.
298
Id. at 9.
293
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are “merely factors to be considered, along with any other relevant
factors, in determining rates under the willing buyer/willing seller
standard.”299 In other words, the correct rates under the willing
buyer/willing seller standard are simply those on which, “absent
special circumstances, most willing buyers and willing sellers
would agree.”300 The two factors are not justifications for deviating
from a market-based rate.301 As such, the willing buyer/willing
seller standard is extremely limited in scope. Not only does it
completely disregard the public interest in the availability of
creative works,302 it also fails to take into consideration the
disruptive impact that high royalty rates will have on the industries
involved. Unlike the 801(b) Standard, which directs the CRB to
settle on a rate that affords both the copyright owner and the
copyright user a fair revenue, the willing buyer/willing seller
standard gives no regard to the income of the copyright user. At its
core, the standard seems to focus on the recording industry’s “sales
of phonorecords” and “streams of revenue,” thus “reflecting the
recording industry’s argument that Internet radio is a threat.”303
Although setting rates that would be acceptable to both
willing buyers and willing sellers seems, on its face, to be a
reasonable approach, it is clear that the standard has failed to
produce appropriate results. After all, why, in a free market
transaction, would any webcaster agree to rates that amount to as
much as 100% or more of their revenues? One of the willing
buyer/willing seller standard’s main deficiencies is that it fails to
adequately account for individualized financial realities in the
marketplace.304 For example, the CRB, in Webcaster II, set one
rate for all webcasters, based on rates negotiated between major
299
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labels and large interactive webcasters. This approach ignores the
unique circumstances that could justify a special status for small
webcasters, who might be able to negotiate lower fees with record
labels.305 Furthermore, the approach also ignores the fact that
independent record labels would likely be willing to offer their
music at a lower rate than major labels as an incentive for
webcasters to broadcast their songs.306 By corralling all webcasters
into a single, under-representative marketplace, rather than
constructing a hypothetical marketplace for each actual market, the
willing buyer/willing seller standard produced royalty rates that are
far higher than what many webcasters would have negotiated in
reality and which very few can afford.307
VI. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The sound recording performance right structure in the
United States is in clear need of reform. In this Part, I will put
forward several proposals, which, if implemented, would help to
rectify the current state of affairs.
A. Achieving Platform Parity
Depending on the medium used to broadcast a sound
recording, the compensation paid to the copyright owner varies
considerably. On the one hand, terrestrial broadcasters—despite
being required to pay songwriters for the use of their works—are
completely exempt from paying royalties to performers and record
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labels. Satellite radio, digital cable radio, and Internet webcasting
services, meanwhile, must pay sound recording copyright holders
for the use of their copyrighted works—yet the royalty rates
imposed by the CRB for these three types of digital radio range
considerably, anywhere from 6% to more than 100% of a service’s
annual revenue. This is despite the fact that all of these services
perform essentially the same function.308 In other words, “whether
and how much an [artist] is paid depends on how a user chooses to
listen to music.”309 There is no logical reason for the vast
differentiation in royalty rates.310
The unequal treatment of the different technological
platforms violates a core governing economic principle; that is,
whenever possible, laws should be technologically neutral. 311 The
overarching goal of copyright law in the United States, as set out in
the Constitution, is “to promote the progress of science and useful
arts.”312 The law has a utilitarian purpose in that it is meant to
incentivize authors to create works. This, in turn, enriches the
public domain.313 Thus, copyright protection is granted with the
purpose of promoting the progress of knowledge and learning for
the good of society. The overall goals of copyright law cannot be
achieved when copyright policy discriminates on the basis of
technology, as is the case with sound recordings.314 When services
that perform essentially the same function are subject to drastically
different royalty rate determination standards, allowing some of
308
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those services to flourish while others fold, the public will not
benefit to the full extent possible from a dissemination of
knowledge and learning.
Platform parity is the notion that “all music services subject
to the sound recording performance royalty should pay a royalty
determined by the same standard.”315 This does not necessarily
mean that all technologies should pay the same royalty rate. It may
very well be necessary that different royalty rates be applied to the
different technological platforms, based on their promotional
value, level of interactivity, and ability to displace sales.316
However, it is crucial that the different technologies be subject to
the same rate-setting standard. Thus, Congress should amend the
current laws so as to direct the CRB to apply the same standard to
all services for which it currently determines royalty rates. Which
of the two standards ought to be applied, however, is the subject of
fierce debate.
On one side of the argument, a group of webcasters, led by
Pandora,317 has come together to urge Congress to adopt the
Internet Radio Fairness Act (IRFA),318 which proposes to replace
the market-oriented willing buyer/willing seller standard with the
four-part 801(b) Standard for setting webcasting royalty rates.
Meanwhile, the RIAA has come out in support of a competing bill
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in draft form, called the Interim FIRST Act,319 which would direct
the CRB to apply the willing buyer/willing seller standard when
setting rates for all services, including those currently
grandfathered to the 801(b) Standard. Unfortunately, the 112th
Congress wrapped up prior to IRFA being passed, and before the
Interim FIRST Act could be introduced. However, it is expected
that both bills will be put forward during the 113th Congress, thus
setting the stage for a political fight that is expected to carry on for
years.320
As discussed above in Part V, the willing buyer/willing
seller standard suffers from various flaws; namely, it disregards the
public interest in the availability of creative works, and fails to
consider the impact that high royalty rates will have on the services
involved. Application of this standard has led to “onerous rates
that, absent congressional intervention, have risked driving
innovative companies out of business.”321 Despite its noble
intentions, the standard fails to produce rates that would willingly
be agreed to by market participants. On the other hand, the broad
nature of the 801(b) Standard allows the CRB to factor in an array
of policy considerations when setting rates. As such, the 801(b)
Standard better captures the constitutional purpose of copyright
law.322 It properly balances the interests of copyright holders,

319
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broadcasters, and the public, thus leading to more equitable royalty
rate determinations for all parties involved.323
Although IRFA has been highly criticized by its
opponents,324 it is clearly a better alternative than the Interim
FIRST Act. Extending the 801(b) Standard to webcasters is the
best approach for achieving platform parity among digital audio
broadcasters. However, when applying the 801(b) Standard, the
CRB must ensure that all services pay a fair rate to sound
recording copyright owners. The CRB, in other words, must strive
to set rates that will allow webcasters to maintain a viable business,
yet not at the expense of copyright owners.325 It is expected that
tensions between sound recording copyright owners and
webcasters will continue to intensify as the 2015 expiration date of
the Pureplay Agreement approaches.326 Thus, it is crucial that
IRFA be reintroduced and passed in the 113th Congress in order to
bring some closure to this contentious issue.
B. Ending the Terrestrial Radio Exemption: The Performance
Rights Act
Although applying the 801(b) Standard to all digital radio
providers will level the playing field among those services, more
needs to be done in order to achieve full platform parity. Namely,
the sound recording public performance royalty exemption
currently enjoyed by terrestrial radio must be brought to an end.
323
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Despite AM/FM broadcasters earning upwards of $20 billion per
year in advertising revenue, they do not pay a cent to the artists and
musicians who bring life to the songs that they broadcast.327 This
issue, for more than three-quarters of a century, has been the
subject of heated debate, with Congress rejecting at least thirty
bills that sought to create a general performance right in sound
recordings.328
On February 4, 2009, the Performance Rights Act (PRA)329
was introduced in slightly different versions in the House of
Representatives and in the Senate, becoming the latest attempt to
rectify the current inequity in royalty payment obligations.
Unfortunately, neither version of the bill advanced to a floor vote
during the 111th Congress. Despite having the full support of the
Obama Administration,330 the PRA was not reintroduced in the
112th Congress. At present, its future remains uncertain.
The PRA aims to expand the scope of § 106(6) exclusive
public performance rights by including all performances made
publicly “by means of an audio transmission,” thereby
encompassing terrestrial broadcasts.331 In essence, the PRA seeks
to end the royalty exemption that AM/FM radio has long enjoyed.
Under the PRA, terrestrial radio stations, like non-interactive
327
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webcasters, would become subject to statutorily prescribed rates as
set out in § 114 of the Copyright Act and as determined by the
CRB.332 Smaller commercial broadcast stations, however, would
be subject to a flat rate royalty fee ranging from $100 to $5000
annually.333 It is estimated that “nearly 80% of radio stations
operating in the United States today would qualify for a flat,
annual rate.”334 Non-profit broadcasters and college radio stations,
meanwhile, would also be subject to discounted annual fees,335
while religious stations and stations that use sound recordings only
incidentally would be completely exempt under the Act.336
For all parties involved, the PRA offers an equitable solution
to the current royalty dispute. As such, it is essential that the PRA
be reintroduced in the 113th Congress and the royalty exemption
for terrestrial broadcasters brought to an end. As discussed below,
there are several compelling reasons why terrestrial broadcasters
should begin paying sound recording copyright holders for the use
of their performances.
1. The Promotional-Value Argument is Flawed and Outdated
Time and time again, Congress’s justification for declining to
extend public performance rights to sound recording copyright
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owners has been the need to maintain “an alleged economic
balance between” the radio industry and recording artists.337
Namely, the belief that radio play spurs record sales has justified
the long-standing imbalance in copyright law as it pertains to
music.338 This “promotional-value” argument claims that recording
artists do not need a general performance right for terrestrial radio
because the promotional value of radio airplay adequately
compensates them for the use of their copyrighted works.339 This
argument is both “invalid and outdated.”340
Whether or not radio airplay indeed provides a promotional
value for recording artists has long been hotly debated.341 Although
it is likely true that terrestrial radio provides some degree of
promotional value to sound recording copyright owners, it is
unquestionable that the extent of that value has been in decline.
With the advent of the Internet and other alternative platforms for
listening to music, terrestrial radio is no longer the force that it
337
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once was. Over the past few decades, the market share historically
held by terrestrial radio has been increasingly usurped by these
alternative platforms for music listening.342 The growing
popularity of iPods, the Internet, and subscription satellite and
digital cable radio services has caused terrestrial radio to lose
listeners, and, along with them, advertising revenue.343
Whereas in the past terrestrial radio was one of the only
effective methods of introducing audiences to new music,344 today,
85% of teenagers discover new music through alternative sources,
such as the Internet.345 The Internet provides consumers with the
means to discover new music and repeatedly listen to one’s
favorite music to an extent not possible on terrestrial radio. A
listener could spend weeks on YouTube, for example—listening to
songs of their choice for free—and not even scratch the surface of
available musical content. The Internet’s user-friendly
functionality and limitless potential puts it light-years ahead of
terrestrial radio, which is a rather stale and outdated model of
exposing consumers to music. The promotional-value argument, in
other words, “is increasingly anachronistic. . . . [I]t presumes that
the 21st Century will be like the 1960s: A world in which radio is
the way to promote new music, and songs that become hits
promote sales of entire albums.”346 Neither of these presumptions
remains true in this modern age. Although traditional radio
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continues to be an influential media source for consumers,347 it is
now one of many platforms used to introduce audiences to new
artists. Moreover, it is likely that terrestrial radio’s market share
and promotional ability will continue to decline in the future.
Not only is terrestrial radio becoming increasingly
unnecessary as a marketing tool used by the recording industry to
expose audiences to new music, its ability to spur record sales is
also questionable. In 2012, “sales of albums and track equivalents
[were] down slightly at -1.8%” from the previous year,348 while
total revenue stood at $16.5 billion—less than half of the
industry’s pre-digital size.349 Regardless of whether people are
tuning in to terrestrial radio, consumers are simply not purchasing
music to the same extent as in the past. This is due, in large part, to
rampant illegal file sharing, which has helped to create an attitude
that music ought to be free.350 For instance, one study found that
the vast majority of teens believe that file sharing is so easy to do,
that it is “unrealistic to expect people not to do it.”351 Music sales
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have suffered as a result of such attitudes. Consumers increasingly
expect that music be available for free, and accessible from
anywhere—a service that webcasters such as Pandora can provide.
Due to the current unhealthy state of the music industry, the
reasons that may have once justified the exemption for terrestrial
broadcasters no longer make “legal, equitable, or economic
sense.”352
2. Creating a Level Playing Field for all Services
As noted above, the goals of copyright law cannot be
achieved when services that perform essentially the same function
are treated unequally. It is crucial that the terrestrial radio royalty
exemption be brought to an end in order to establish a better
balance between digital audio transmission services and terrestrial
broadcasters. So long as terrestrial broadcasters remain exempt
from paying sound recording performance royalties, they will have
an unfair advantage over webcasters, and, to a lesser extent,
satellite radio and digital cable radio services. Webcasters are
simply unable to compete with terrestrial radio. As such, the
exemption currently enjoyed by terrestrial radio—to the detriment
of Internet radio—no longer makes sense.
The unequal treatment of the various mediums is especially
unjust considering that Internet radio provides a greater
promotional value for artists than terrestrial radio.353 Despite the
music industry’s suffering revenues as of late, digital sales are in
fact thriving. For instance, in 2012, digital albums and tracks saw
year-over-year sales increases of 14.1% and 5.1%, respectively.354
The relatively healthy state of the digital music market is due in
part to the fact that webcasters facilitate the purchase of music. For
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instance, “on most webcasting stations, the artist’s name, song
name, and album name are displayed next to a purchase option, a
feature not available on terrestrial radio stations.”355 Moreover,
Internet radio broadens the public’s access to music to an extent
not possible on terrestrial radio by providing a platform for
independent artists and non-mainstream genres of music.356 That is
to say, Internet radio services advance the interests of artists in
ways that terrestrial broadcasters cannot,357 yet pay exorbitant
royalty fees. Terrestrial radio, meanwhile, continues to enjoy an
exemption from paying public performance royalties to artists,
despite its waning ability to hold up its end of the bargain in its
supposed symbiotic relationship with the music industry. Under
this scheme, the competitive landscape “is biased in favor of the
old establishment players and against new start-up and innovative
technologies.”358
3. Performers Deserve Compensation for Their Work
Without question, the performance of a song can add great
value to a musical composition. As demonstrated by Aretha
Franklin’s powerful rendition of “Respect,” a talented performer
can bring new life to a musical work by adding unique elements
that appeal to listeners. This explains why certain versions of a
355
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composition are more popular than others, and why nonperforming songwriters dream of having their songs sung by the
top performers in the industry. Performers also serve as
indispensable intermediaries, enabling listeners to enjoy musical
works. Without such intermediaries, audiences would be left with
nothing more than written musical score—something that very few
of us can fully appreciate or enjoy. Non-performing songwriters,
for instance, require performers to bring life to their compositions.
Performers thus play an essential role in connecting audiences with
musical compositions.
Because the performance of a song adds value to a musical
composition, it also provides value to terrestrial radio broadcasters,
who will broadcast what the audience wants to hear. For this
reason, it is only fair that broadcasters compensate sound recording
copyright owners for the use of their creative works. As the
promotional-value argument becomes increasingly anachronistic
and invalid, there is no reason why performers and songwriters
should be treated differently when their songs are played on
terrestrial radio. Both songwriters and performers should be paid
because both are important in the creative process.
Not only is terrestrial radio’s exemption from paying
performance rights for sound recordings harmful to recording
artists, it is also inconsistent with the legislative intent of the
Copyright Act.359 Although allowing terrestrial radio stations to
broadcast music to vast audiences without compensating the
performer may increase the public’s access to recorded musical
works in the short-term, it fails to incentivize the artist, thus
reducing the likelihood that new recordings will be produced in the
future. This practice is thus contrary to the utilitarian purpose of
copyright law.360 As music sales continue to struggle, resulting in
declining income for performers, there is no reason why
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songwriters should be incentivized to compose songs, while
performers are not equally incentivized to create sound recordings.
Due to the current state of the music industry, “recording artists
need and deserve the . . . full complement of copyrights granted to
all other creators.”361 Terrestrial broadcasters, like any other
business, should pay for the inputs that allow their industry to
succeed. Any industry that profits off the labor of others should be
required to pay those who provide the labor.362
The PRA would help to correct the current royalty imbalance
by making “property ownership benefits for sound recordings
equal to that of musical works and every other copyrightable
expression.”363 Importantly, the proposed Act includes a provision
that preserves performance rights for musical works. This would
ensure that the gains for recording artists would not come at the
expense of compositional copyright holders.364
4. U.S. Performers are Losing Out on Foreign Royalties
The lack of a general performance right in the United States
is not simply an issue of artists losing out on compensation
domestically. The ramifications of the exemption stretch far
beyond America’s borders. When it comes to the production and
exportation of sound recordings, the United States has long been a
dominant force, standing head and shoulders above all other
nations.365 “American music gets more radio airplay around the
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world than the music of any other country.”366 Yet, despite this
impressive cultural output, the United States is one of the only
industrialized nations that does not provide sound recordings with
a general performance right.367 Because the United States does not
pay a performance royalty to foreign performers when their songs
are played on U.S. terrestrial radio, many foreign countries
withhold performance royalties owed to American artists when
their songs are played abroad—even though such countries
compensate their own artists and the artists of countries other than
the United States.368 As such, the lack of a general performance
right results in a significant net loss to the U.S. economy,369
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Hearing on H.R. 848, supra note 358, at 194 (prepared statement of
Mitch Bainwol, Chairman and CEO, RIAA).
367
Day, Super Brawl, supra note 40, at 197–98; see SYDNOR, supra note
34, at 13 (“The U.S. is now the only OEDC [Organisation For Economic Cooperation and Development] nation that fails to provide the general publicperformance rights for sound recordings required by both the 1963 Rome
Convention and the 1996 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty
[WPPT].”) The U.S. is not a party to the Rome Convention; it did accede to the
WPPT, however, “the U.S. has opted out of the public performance right under
[WPPT] Art. 15(3), except with respect to certain digital transmissions.” La
France, supra note 76, at 226
368
Hearing on H.R. 848, supra note 358, at 194; see La France, supra note
76, at 224 (noting that foreign rights societies withhold royalties owed to U.S.
performers due to the absence of material reciprocity). For example, royalties
withheld from U.S. artists in France are given to the French Ministry of Culture,
and are ultimately used to subsidize competing French artists, thus enriching
France at the expense of U.S. sound recording copyright owners. SYDNOR, supra
note 34, at 13–14. “The performance royalty collection practices of other
countries vary widely,” with some countries opting “not [to] collect royalties
arising from the broadcast of U.S. sound recordings,” some opting to “collect
and impound them, and others opting to collect them and divert them toward
other purposes.” Id. at 14 n.39.
369
If there was no exemption for U.S. terrestrial broadcasters, the amount
in royalties paid by foreign broadcasters to U.S. artists and labels would far
outweigh the amount paid by U.S. terrestrial broadcasters to foreign artists and
labels, considering that U.S. artists receive the bulk of airplay around the world.
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potentially to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars.370 Both
U.S. performers and record labels miss out on this much-needed
income while their counterparts—songwriters and publishers—
receive royalties from broadcasters from around the globe for the
use of their compositions.
VII. CONCLUSION
The time to end the discriminatory treatment inherent in
U.S. copyright law is long overdue. It is essential that Congress act
swiftly to correct the current imbalances in the law by: (i) ending
the royalty exemption currently enjoyed by terrestrial radio; and
(ii) subjecting all services to the same royalty rate determination
standard. In this paper, I have demonstrated how the current
system is strikingly unfair. First, the law creates an incentive
structure for songwriters that is absent for performers, thus failing
to recognize the great value that performers add to a composition.
Second, by subjecting webcasters to the willing buyer/willing
seller standard, rather than to the more sensible 801(b) Standard,
the law prevents webcasters from successfully competing with
other radio technologies. Terrestrial broadcasters, in particular, are
afforded an incredible advantage over their competition; they are
permitted to broadcast sound recordings without having to
compensate the performers who bring those songs to life. Old
technology, in other words, receives favorable treatment under the
law. This is done on the basis of the outdated and flawed
promotional-value argument, at the expense of newer, more
innovative technology. The law, in its current form, is not
technologically neutral, and must be amended.
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La France, supra note 76, at 226. Estimates of how much U.S. artists
forego in foreign royalties vary widely. One expert estimates that U.S. recording
artists have lost roughly $600 million in foreign performance royalties over the
last several years. Id. Others estimate that foreign collecting societies withhold
$70-100 million in royalties per year from U.S. performers and labels. Id.
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Not only do these unfair copyright policies disadvantage
performers and webcasters, they also inhibit the creation of new
music. Because performers do not receive compensation equal to
that of their songwriting counterparts, this policy, at its extreme,
has the potential to dissuade the next Aretha Franklin from
choosing a career as a recording artist.371 As a result,
groundbreaking performances of pre-existing compositions may be
less likely to occur, thus potentially depriving the public of
culturally valuable forms of artistic expression. In this modern era
of declining music sales, it is crucial that performers be granted a
full public performance right in order to ensure that they are as
incentivized as their songwriting counterparts to create music.
By imposing prohibitively high royalty burdens on
webcasters, the law threatens to deprive the public of an excellent
platform for accessing music. Despite the fact that all radio
services perform essentially the same basic function, webcasting
offers a number of unique advantages over its competitors.
Namely, because there is no limit to the number of webcasters that
can occupy the airwaves, webcasting technology delivers a wealth
of musical variety to listeners. 372 This, in turn, provides lesserknown, independent artists with exposure to the public—an
opportunity that is not often available to them on terrestrial

371

In addition, the policy might incentivize performers to compose their
own songs, thus potentially resulting in lower-quality compositions. Arguably,
the best music will result when a talented songwriter pairs with a talented
performer. In many cases, a songwriter can perform these two roles to great
results. However, not all talented performers are capable of writing their own
songs. Such performers should nonetheless be fully incentivized to record the
compositions of others. See Sen, supra note 64, at 236 (arguing that the
Copyright Act’s current imbalanced incentive structure has had a positive effect
in that it has led to the rise of the performer-songwriter movement, which has in
turn substantially contributed “to the exchange of [the] political ideals that
underlie our democratic institutions, while imposing only small costs on
performers”).
372
See Pals, supra note 31, at 692.
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radio.373 As a result, webcasting enriches the public domain by
promoting the dissemination of unique forms of musical
expression to vast audiences. By subjecting Internet radio to the
flawed willing buyer/willing seller standard, the law threatens to
deprive the public of a valuable resource by preventing webcasters
from effectively competing with other radio services. Without this
important forum for publicly performing their works, nonmainstream artists might, in turn, be dissuaded from creating new
music. The current policies are thus contrary to copyright law’s
overarching purpose of promoting the progress of science and the
useful arts, as set out in the U.S. Constitution. Performers and
webcasters are just asking for a little respect. It is high time that we
give it to them.
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